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Title VI and Health Facilities: Forms
Without Substance
By KENNETH WING*
Its (the 1970 report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights) basic
conclusion was that the great promise of civil rights laws had not been
realized, that thefederal government had notyetful prepared itself to
carry out the civil rights mandate....
7.. The Federal response has been. with afew signiffcant ex-
ceptions, a continuation of tentativefirst steps towards more stringent
civil rights enforcement and promises of better performance in the
future.
Introduction
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which prohibits racial
discrimination by recipients of federal funds, is part of one of the most
controversial and important pieces of legislation in American history.
Title VI was enacted primarily to prohibit segregation in publicly-
funded schools, but it applies to all recipients of federal funds, includ-
ing institutions that provide health care.3
In the fourteen years since the 1964 legislation, Title VI enforce-
ment in the field of education has generated much political controversy
and has had a far reaching impact on the nation's educational institu-
tions.4 The impact of Title VI enforcement on health facilities,
however, is much more difficult to assess. The major controversy gen-
* B.A. 1968, University of California, Santa Cruz; J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School;
M.P.H. 1972, Harvard School of Public Health. Assistant Professor, School of Law and
School of Public Health, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. From 1975 to 1977,
the author was Deputy Civil Rights Officer and legal counsel for the California State De-
partment of Health.
1. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RiGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT-SEVEN MONTHS LATER 3 (1971).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 252-53
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1970)). The 1964 Act is summarized at text ac-
companying notes 50-53 infra.
3. For a discussion of the application of Title VI to individual physicians receiving
federal funds, see notes 72 & 193 infra.
4. See generally III UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL
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erated in this area has revolved around the government's attempts to
establish a meaningful monitoring and enforcement program rather
than around actual attempts to eliminate the widespread racial discrim-
ination which exists in the health-facility context.5 Civil-rights groups,
including the United States Commission on Civil Rights, have fre-
quently criticized the federal government's efforts as ineffective and in-
adequate.6 Even the government officials charged with responsibility
for administering the Title VI enforcement program have generally
agreed that the program has been less than successful in monitoring
health-facility compliance, although these officials usually cite a lack of
resources and staff as the primary reason for this failure.7 It is also
likely that most administrators of health facilities subject to Title VI are
dissatisfied with a program that very often adds to their paperwork yet
infrequently deals with matters of substantial importance.
For a health facility to comply with Title VI usually requires only
that the facility sign a nondiscrimination agreement,8 one of many
forms appended to the lengthy, government fund applications that fa-
cilities must execute but need not take seriously. Compliance with Ti-
tle VI can and should mean much more to a health facility.
Achieving racial equality through the enforcement of civil rights is
an important national policy. The country is currently going through a
historically unprecedented examination of both the delivery of health
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974].
5. See notes 96-173 & accompanying text infra.
6. See, e.g., VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4 at 109-209. The United
States Commission on Civil Rights was established in 1957. 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). The Commission was established primarily to monitor and investigate civil
rights violations, but it has served as a watchdog over the government's efforts to enforce
civil rights. The periodic reports of the Commission are one of the primary sources of
empirical data used in this Article. The quality of the reports varies greatly; although some
are excellent, others contain sloppy work such as demonstrating a lack of awareness of pre-
vious Commission reports. Frequently, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) have taken issue with the conclusions in the
reports. An attempt has been made in this Article to use the reports selectively and to cite
parallel sources when available.
7. See Hearings on J Stanley Potinger to be Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on
Title VI Enforcement in Medicare and Medicaid Programs Before the Subcomm. on Civil
Rights and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
128-84 (1973) (testimony of Peter Holmes) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]; HEW, NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, PROPOSED ANNUAL OPERATING
PLAN FOR FY 1978, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,823 (1977).
8. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
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services as a whole and of its constituent institutions.9 Serious changes
are likely, although it is difficult to predict their exact nature.' 0 How-
ever, the role of the institutional provider of health services will remain
central to the health care delivery system. It is also likely that the ma-
jority of health facilities will remain privately owned and administered,
a situation which distinguishes the American system from those other
industrialized countries. 1 Whatever system emerges, health facilities
must be held accountable to the society for ensuring that its services are
available to all regardless of race.
Although the basic scheme of government-funded, privately-ad-
minister6d health facilities will continue to underlie the health-care de-
livery system, government control, or at least scrutiny, of these facilities
is likely to increase. It is in this context that the issue of racial discrim-
ination in the delivery of health services must be confronted directly.
9. Significant issues have been raised regarding the quality and distribution of health
care that Americans receive. Some critics argue that too high a proportion of the health-
care dollar is spent on curative medical care, rather than on less expensive and more effec-
tive methods of preventive medicine. See generally I. ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE (1976);
J. KNOWLES, DOING BETTER AND FEELING WORSE (1977); G. ROSEN, PREVENTIVE
MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES 1900-1975 (1977). Increases in health care costs drama-
tize another aspect of the crisis. Since 1965, the overall cost of health care has grown at an
annual rate of 12%, exceeding the rate of inflation for the rest of the economy. In that time,
the. cost of hospital care and physician services has quadrupled and tripled, respectively.
See SOCIAL SECURITY BULL., April 1977, at 12. The nation's health bill has risen from
$38.9 billion in 1965, to almost $140 billion in 1976, representing a proportional rise in the
GNP from 5.9% to 8.6%. Id. at 4. Projections for 1980 anticipate continued increases to
levels over $230 billion and 9%. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEW, FORWARD PLAN FOR
HEALTH 1978-82, at 30 (1976).
10. Congress is currently examining several national health insurance proposals. See,
e.g, H.R. 760, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Carter administration has advocated
mandatory limitations on increases in health facilities' costs. H.R. REP. No. 6575, S. REP.
No. 1391, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977). A variety of mandatory and regulatory controls are
being imposed at both the state and the federal levels. See, e.g., The National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-t (Supp. V 1975), which
officially recognized the magnitude of the problem of providing equal access to quality
healthcare at a reasonable cost. The purpose of the Act is to further the development of
state and federal health care programs by providing staff power, facilities, and financial
assistance. Recently there has even been a serious proposal by The American Public Health
Association for a nationalized health service. Public Health Unit Pressesfor "National
Health Service," Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1977, at A2.
11. Of 7,156 hospitals in the country in 1975, 382 were federal, 2,306 were state and
local government operated, 3,562 were private nonprofit, and 906 were investor owned (for
profit). Most large hospitals are private, nonprofit institutions, and the vast majority of
general, acute-care hospital beds are in such institutions. COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ON
HEALTH FACILITIES AND POPULATION 25 (American Hospital Association 1977). No indus-
trial country other than the United States depends on private facilities for most of its health
care. See Abel-Smith, Major Patterns f Financing and Organization of Medical Care in
Countries Other than the United States, in SOCIAL POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE 25 (1969).
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The general problem of access to health-care services, and the specific
problem of inequitable treatment of racial minorities, will be important
in any governmental decisions to increase regulation or to reallocate
resources. This is particularly true because the increased costs of
health care have made the denial of adequate care a growing reality for
more people. The enforcement of Title VI will exemplify the govern-
ment's ability and willingness to regulate health-care providers and to
impose public policy on ostensibly private institutions.
It must be noted at the outset of this Article that the nature and
extent of the problem of racial discrimination in health facilities is diffi-
cult to define with specificity. It is generally known that prior to 1964
many health facilities maintained open policies of racial segregation or
explicitly excluded minorities. There is also fairly convincing proof
that since 1964 these policies have been eliminated. Does discrimina-
tion continue despite the elimination of these policies? If so, in what
form? Because of the inadequate manner in which the Title VI en-
forcement program has been administered, there is little monitoring of
health facility compliance and virtually no available data generated on
the services delivered to minorities. What evidence exists must be de-
rived from collateral sources.
The evidence that is available, as will be explained in greater de-
tail in Part V of this Article, indicates that substantial inequities con-
tinue to exist. There are significant patterns of segregation in the
delivery of institutionally-based health services.12 In addition, racial
minorities are significantly underserved by the nation's health facilities
despite indications that minorities have a greater need for health
services. 13
The question is whether these inequities constitute racial discrimi-
nation in the legal sense of the term and, if so, whether they can be
legally attributable to particular health facilities. Even a cursory ex-
amination of the complicated arrangements through which patients are
referred to health facilities and receive treatment suggests a number of
difficult legal issues that must be addressed before these questions can
be answered. 14 Unfortunately, because of poor data collection, we are
not yet at a point when these issues can be directly addressed. The
attempts to enforce Title VI have not only failed to isolate the key is-
sues or contribute to their resolution, they have failed even to describe
adequately the general outlines of the problem. What little is known
12. See text accompanying notes 179-80 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 181-84 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 193-98 infra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
HeinOnline  -- 30 Hastings L. J. 140 1978-1979
TITLE VI AND HEALTH FACILITIES
about the nature and extent of racial discrimination in health facilities
is disturbing. The fact that so little is known is itself cause for concern.
As a consequence of this lack of data, this Article does not focus
on substantive issues. Rather, this Article attempts to document the
relevant legislative and political history of Title VI as it relates to
health facilities, to detail the implementation of the enforcement pro-
gram, and to assess the current status of both the enforcement program
and the problem that it is trying to resolve. Ways will be suggested in
which the agencies involved can better meet the goals of Title VI.
Parts I and II describe the problem of racial discrimination in
health facilities prior to 1964 and the relevance of this problem to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. What little has been written
relating racial discrimination in health facilities to the enactment of
Title VI has not always been entirely accurate. In particular, infer-
ences concerning health facilities drawn from the legislative history of
Title VI must be carefully construed because of the unusual course the
bill followed through Congress, the drastic changes that occurred in the
bill at various points, and the incredible range of problems that were
being considered at that time. When the difficult substantive issues of
applying Title VI to health facilities are finally addressed, this history
will have an important role in the final determination of the intent and
meaning of this potentially far-reaching legislation.
Parts III and IV describe the initial implementation of the Title VI
health-facilities enforcement program during the period following the
enactment of Medicaid and Medicare, and the eventual development of
a complex, administrative program that relies predominantly on com-
plaint investigation and the monitoring of enforcement activities by
state health agencies to assure compliance with Title VI. Few people
actually understand the complicated arrangements between the state
health agencies and HEW, and there is considerable evidence that
when these arrangements have become final, they are not being carried
out in an effective manner. It is this inadequate attempt to develop a
realistic enforcement program that is largely responsible for the failure
of HEW adequately to define the problem or to contribute to its
resolution.
Part V is a description of what is known about the problem of
racial discrimination in health facilities and the impact of Title VI en-
forcement. It includes a description of recent litigation which clearly
illustrates some of the problems of racial discrimination in today's
health facilities. It is this litigation that may force HEW to improve its
enforcement program and eventually confront the real substantive is-
September 1978]
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sues. Part VI suggests changes in the administration of Title VI that
could improve the enforcement program. The goal of this Article is to
lay the foundation for an understanding of the history and current sta-
tus of Title VI enforcement in health facilities and to contribute to the
resolution of a problem that continues to plague our nation.
Federal Policy Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Prior to the enactment of Title VI, federal agencies made token
efforts to adopt policies prohibiting racial discrimination in programs
or activities receiving federal funds. 15 There is little indication, how-
ever, that these few exceptional policies were ever vigorously enforced.
They clearly were not representative of an overall federal commitment
to prohibit discrimination by recipients of federal funds or to use fed-
eral funding as leverage to achieve a national policy of racial equality.
The legislative history of Title V116 indicates that most federal agencies
were unwilling or felt themselves unable to prohibit discrimination
without a specific, legislative authority or mandate. 17  Most agencies,
15. The United States Commission on Civil Rights claims, without providing a list,
that prior to 1964 several federal agencies adopted funding policies prohibiting racial dis-
crimination although they had no explicit authority to do so. UNITED STATES COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL PROGRAMS: AN ANALYSIS OF TITLE VI
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 7 (1968). In addition, executive orders had banned
racial discrimination in the armed services, Exec. Order No. 9,981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-48
Comp.) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,051, 3 C.F.R. 635 (1959-63 Comp.)); in employment
by federal government contractors, Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-53 Comp.)
(revoked by Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1958-63 Comp.)); and in federally sup-
ported housing, Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63 Comp.). There was, how-
ever, no explicit statutory authority. See note 17 infra.
16. Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within
the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. II, III, IV (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
The hearing record is in four parts. Part I includes the text of the 167 different bills that
were submitted to the House during the Spring of 1963. Parts II and III include the testi-
mony of 101 witnesses, 70 prepared statements, and 22 written communications with the
subcommittee. Part IV is actually labeled Hearings on HR. 7152 and is a transcript of the
executive session of the full Committee on the Judiciary that occurred after the subcommit-
tee reported the first version of the final civil-rights bill. Because of the unusual legislative
procedures that were to follow, see notes 40-51 & accompanying text infra, this was the only
committee to hold full hearings on the 1964 civil rights legislation.
17. Whether there was inherent or implied executive authority to prohibit discrimina-
tion was a much debated issue prior to the enactment of Title VI. Early in 1963, the United
States Civil Rights Commission urged President Kennedy either to require such a policy of
all federal agencies or to seek the authority to do so. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1963), sum-
marized at 110 CONG. REC. 6994-7001 (1964). President Kennedy publicly expressed
doubts as to whether he had the power to prohibit discrimination absent legislative author-
ity. See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Implementation and Impact, 36
[Vol. 30
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therefore, continued to fund health, education, and social-welfare pro-
grams without regard to the recipients' policies on racial discrimina-
tion, even when the funding recipient was openly segregated.' 8
The history of the Hill-Burton, health-facilities construction pro-
gram, 19 which was the major health-related, federal-funding program 2°
between 1946 and 1965, is a good illustration of the pre-1964 attitude of
most federal agencies towards discrimination practiced by recipients of
federal funds. The Hill-Burton program was enacted for the purpose
of eliminating what was then perceived to be the major problem in
health care in this country, a shortage of beds in hospitals and other
health facilities.21 Federal funds were made available to states that
instituted a survey of their need for health facilities, developed a plan
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 827 n.14 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. He eagerly took
credit, however, for the actions of those agencies that assumed such authority. See CIVIL
RIGHTS AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), cited infull at 109 CONG. REC.
11174 (1963), in which President Kennedy outlines the accomplishments of the agencies
discussed at note 15 supra.
The concept of inherent or implied executive authority is important despite the enact-
ment of Title VI because the issue may still arise in two contexts. First, a state official might
attempt to use a general state-licensing statute to prohibit discriminatory action by licensed
bodies. See note 105 & accompanying text infra. Second, a federal agency may choose to
take steps to ensure affirmative action beyond those required by Title VI.
Convincing arguments can be made that the executive may prohibit discrimination by
recipients of state or federal funds without explicit statutory authority to do so. As a general
proposition, absent an explicit, congressional requirement or prohibition, the federal execu-
tive is free to contract on any terms or conditions it may find appropriate. Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 373 U.S. 546, 580 (1963); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 116 (1954).
Federal or state funding of private or public operations can certainly be characterized as
contractual in nature. Furthermore, any congressional requirement or prohibition in a
health or welfare program that prevented the executive from curtailing discriminatory prac-
tices would probably be void as illegal discrimination itself.
It can also be argued that a prohibition on racial discrimination by recipients of funds is
not only permitted but required if the government funding represents sufficient involvement
with the funded activity to constitute state action. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), discussed at notes 28-
30 & accompanying text infra.
18. A few federal programs were specifically authorized to provide financial assistance
to segregated institutions. See, e.g., Morrill Act, 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1976) (aid to agricultural
and mechanical, "A & M," colleges) (apparently still in effect); Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §
291 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (aid for construction of health facilities). For a discussion of the
Hill-Burton Act, see notes 19-33 & accompanying text infra.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
20. The Hill-Burton program was the first major federal investment in the health-care
delivery system. It has been estimated that nearly half the hospitals in the country have
received Hill-Burton funds since 1946. Rose, The H-Burton Act-The Interim Regulation
and Service to the Poor:.A Study in Public Interest Litigation, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 309
(1972).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970) (statement of legislative purpose).
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to meet those needs, and maintained a system of licensing that would
ensure a minimum standard of facility quality and safety.22 Public
and nonprofit, private institutions that could show a need for expanded
facilities under the state plan applied through the state for federal con-
struction funds.
Receipt of Hill-Burton funds, in the form of direct grants, loans or
loan guarantees, required little from the facility beyond an assurance
that it would provide a reasonable volume of care to people who were
unable to pay and that it would be available to all persons in the ser-
viced area without regard to race, creed, or color.23 This assurance
was not required, however, if "equitable provision for separate popula-
tion groups," was made by the recipient facility. 24 There was, in effect,
a statutory "separate but equal" exception to the nondiscrimination re-
quirement. From 1946 to 1963, 70 out of nearly 7,000 recipients of
Hill-Burton funding qualified under this exception. 25 All other Hill-
Burton recipients executed an assurance of nondiscrimination, but
many of them continued to engage in disparate practices based on ra-
cial critieria.
This situation was due in large part to HEW's rather limited view
of what constituted discrimination. 26 According to HEW policy, a fa-
cility that did not qualify for the exception could not deny a person
admission on the basis of race to that part of the facility constructed
with Hill-Burton funds; admission could still be denied to those parts
of the same facility that were not constructed with the federal-program
funds. While no patient in the facility could be denied "essential serv-
ices," patients could be segregated within a facility and individual med-
ical practitioners could be denied privileges or employment on the
basis of their race.
22. Id. Prior to 1946 and the incentives of the Hill-Burton program, many states did
not license hospitals. See generally A. SOMERS, HOSPITAL REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF
PUBLIC POLICY (1969). See also note 105 infra.
23. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, ch. 958, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (repealed
1964).
24. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1956) (repealed 1964).
25. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOSPI-
TALS AND HEALTH FACILITIES: CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES UNDER THE HILL-BURTON
PROGRAM (1965) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOSPITALS]. See text ac-
companying notes 179 & 192 infra.
26. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOSPITALS, supra note 25, at 6, citing the opinion of
HEW General Counsel interpreting 45 C.F.R. § 112 (revised later, see note 31 infra) as it
applied to facilities receiving funds prior to Simkins.
[Vol. 30
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In 1963, in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosital,27 a
group of black physicians, dentists, and patients brought suit against
two Greensboro, North Carolina, hospitals that had received Hill-Bur-
ton funds under the "separate but equal" exception.28 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant hospitals' refusal to grant staff privileges to
black practitioners and to admit black patients29 discriminated against
them in violation of their rights to equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the Hill-Burton program and the receipt of Hill-Burton funds by
the hospitals constituted state action30 and declared the separate-but-
equal exception unconstitutional.
In response to Simkins, HEW issued new Hill-Burton regula-
tions,31 specifying that the requirement of nondiscrimination meant
27. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). The district court
opinion in this case is found at 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
28. Both facilities named as defendants had received sizeable Hill-Burton grants.
Cone Hospital received $462,000 in 1954 and $807,950 in 1960, which amounted to approxi-
mately 15% of the total construction costs of the two projects. Wesley Long Community
Hospital received a grant of $1,617,150 in 1959 and grants of $66,000 and $265,000 in 1961,
which amounted to approximately 50% of the cost of the projects. 323 F.2d at 963. In each
case, HEW approved funding applications that stated that the "requirement of non-discrimi-
nation has been met because this is an area where separate hospital facilities are provided
for separate population groups." 211 F. Supp. at 633.
29. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital had a policy of denying staff privileges to black
practitioners and admitted black patients only under limited circumstances. Wesley Long
Community Hospital also had a policy of denying privileges to black practitioners and ad-
mitted no black patients.
30. 323 F.2d at 967 (quoting the standard enunciated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715,724 (1961)). It should be noted that the Supreme Court later indicated
that state involvement with a private institution that has a policy of discrimination must be
directly related to that policy in order for there to be state action. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (state issued liquor license to club that refused service to blacks).
Note, however, the qualitative difference between liquor licensing and health-facility licens-
ing. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Both Moose
Lodge and Jackson seem to indicate the Court's unwillingness to expand state action to the
extent suggested in Burton and followed in Simkins.
The Fourth Circuit, however, continues to find state action in Hill-Burton participation
alone. See, ag., Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
For a good analysis of the Fourth Circuit cases as well as other bases for judicial review of
the policies of private hospitals, see Note, Judicial Review of Private Hospital Actif'ides, 75
MICH. L. REv. 445 (1976). Although the broader, state-action implication of Simkins has
not been followed in most other circuits, it is a generally recognized authority with regard to
race discrimination by health facilities. See Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976);
Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476
F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
31. 29 Fed. Reg. 6,497 (1964). When Congress renewed the Hill-Burton program in
1964, it omitted both the nondiscrimination requirement and the separate but equal provi-
sion from the statute. Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 603(a), 78 Stat. 451 (1964). Later, a broader
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that practitioners could not be denied privileges on the basis of race,
color, or creed; patients could not be segregated within an institution;
and discrimination in admission would be prohibited in all sections of
a facility constructed in whole or in part with Hill-Burton funds.
HEW's general counsel, however, took the position that these regula-
tions were applicable only to pending applications and future Hill-Bur-
ton recipients. 32 Even after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and its implementing regulations clearly prohibited these types of dis-
crimination, HEW persisted in holding the position that Hill-Burton
recipients receiving funds prior to January 4, 1965, the effective date of
the new regulations, were bound only by the original narrow definition
of discrimination.33 It was not until the implementation of Medicare
and Medicaid, which brought almost all hospitals and nursing homes
within the purview of the Title VI regulations, that discrimination in
these health facilities was effectively prohibited.
"community service" requirement was added in its place obligating recipients of Hill-Burton
funds to make their services available to all persons residing in the area. 42 U.S.C. §
291c(e) (1970). In December 1964, new Hill-Burton regulations were issued, amending the
nondiscrimination requirement to apply only to discrimination based on creed and includ-
ing language drawing attention to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its Title VI
regulations (to be issued shortly thereafter). 42 C.F.R. 53.111-.112 (1964). The current
Hill-Burton regulations continue to use the following language (although the sections have
been rearranged several times):
(a) Before an application is recommended by a state agency to the Secretary for
approval, the state agency shall obtain an assurance from the applicant that all
portions and services of the entire facility for the construction or modernization of
which, or in connection with which, aid under the Act is sought will be made avail-
able without discrimination on account of creed and no professionally qualified
person will be discriminated against on account of creed with respect to the privi-
lege of professional practice in the facility.
(c) Attention is called to the requirement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 78 Stat. 252) which provides that no person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. A regulation imple-
menting such Title VI, applicable to assistance under this part of or construction
and modernization of hospitals and medical facilities, has been issued by the secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare with the approval of the President.
Arguably, race discrimination is now a violation of the community-service requirement, 42
U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1970); 42 C.F.R. § 53.113 (1976), as well as a violation of Title VI, despite
the 1964 change in the regulations.
32. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOSPITALS, supra note 25, at 7.
33. Id. at 9. See also 110 CONG. REc. 1527 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler indicating
that Title VI would not be applied retroactively).
[Vol. 30
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The Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
It would be futile to try to isolate all of the key historical and polit-
ical factors that led to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Several factors, however, are undeniably important and particularly
relevant to a consideration of Title VI.
In the decade following Brown v. Board of Education,34 it became
increasingly obvious that reliance solely on traditional remedies or ju-
dicial intervention was not an effective means of eliminating discrimi-
nation. The courts proved unable to fashion suitable remedies to deal
with institutionalized discrimination, and, in some cases, state and local
governments were prepared to defy court orders.35 During the same
period it became clear that, despite a few isolated, executive actions,
there was no clearly-defined, federal policy either regarding the affirm-
ative steps that the executive should take to enforce the law or, as
Simkins demonstrated, regarding the limits of direct or indirect, gov-
ernmental involvement with discriminatory, private action.
The political climate of this period was reflected in the fact that
both major political parties made the enactment of new civil-rights leg-
islation part of their 1960 national platform.36 Yet by the spring of
1963 President Kennedy, despite public commitments to do so, had
neither secured nor even proposed new legislation.
In June 1963, with racial violence flaring in several parts of the
country, Kennedy sent a special message37 to both houses of Congress
urging them to remain in session until a comprehensive, civil-rights bill
could be passed.38
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. See Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L.
REv. 42 (1967); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1133 (1977); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOSPITALS, supra note 25; 110 CONG. REc. 1517
(1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
36. Both platforms are cited at 110 CONG. REc. 1511-12 (1964).
37. Civil. RIGHTS AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
38. Civil-rights legislation had been proposed earlier in the session. The first civil-
rights bill, submitted in January of 1963, was introduced by the ranking minority member of
the House Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 3139, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The bill
was described by the author as comprehensive, but moderate. 109 CONG. REc. 1538 (1963).
The bill would have made permanent the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, protected voting
rights in federal elections, limited literacy tests for voting, offered financial assistance to
schools attempting to desegregate, and required equal-opportunity employment in govern-
ment-sponsored employment contracts. At least 172 similar bills were submitted by various
members of Congress throughout the following spring dealing with all or some of the same
issues. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1964).
The entire Republican, minority membership of the Committee submitted identical
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In the Senate Kennedy's 39 proposed legislation was referred to
committee but was never reported back to the floor.40 In the House41
extensive hearings were held by a subcommittee of the Committee on
bills the same day. The Republican strategy was apparently to upstage the Democratic
administration and embarrass the President for failing to follow through on his campaign
promises. See 109 CONG. REC. 1560 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay).
The first Democratic bill was introduced on the President's behalf by Congressman
Celler on April 4, 1963. H.R. 5455, 5456, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); see 109 CONG. REC.
5832 (1963). See also H.R. Doc. No. 75, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 109
CONG. REC. 3245 (1963), President Kennedy's first, moderately-toned message to Congress
submitted to the House of Representatives on February 28, 1963. This first Kennedy propo-
sal was an unremarkable bill extending the life of the Civil Rights Commission and making
several minor proposals for amendment of existing civil-rights legislation; it did not include
a Title VI type provision.
39. H.R. 7152, S. 1731, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). For text of the bill, see 109 CONG.
REc. 11077 (1963). The President's new bill went far beyond his first proposal by including
additional provisions prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, giving the At-
torney General the authority to initiate suits against segregated school systems, establishing
an equal-employment-opportunity commission, and prohibiting discrimination in federally-
funded programs. The bill included the following: Title I: protection of voting rights; Title
II: injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations; Title III: desegrega-
tion of public education; Title IV: establishment of a community relations service; Title V:
extension of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Title VI: prohibition of discrimination in
federal programs; Title VII: creation of an equal-employment commission. Cf. note 50 infra
(final bill).
40. Senate Majority Leader Mansfield submitted the President's bill. S. 1731, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Later that same day Mansfield submitted S. 1750, a bill jointly
sponsored by the minority leader Sen. Dirksen, which contained a somewhat smaller range
of provisions. See 109 CONG. REC. 11083 (1963). Among other things the jointly-spon-
sored bill lacked provisions relating to employment discrimination which were contained in
Title VII of the President's bill. See note 39 supra.
Senator Mansfield also submitted S. 1732 on behalf of himself and Senator Magnuson;
the bill concerned discrimination in public accommodations and essentially corresponded to
Title II of the President's bill. S. 1732 was referred to the Committee on Commerce of
which Magnuson was chairman, 109 CONG. REc. 11083 (1963), and it was the only Senate
bill to clear committee, see note 45 infra, and therefore the report on S. 1732 is cited as part
of the official legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even though it is only tangen-
tially related to it. See S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355.
41. Representative Celler submitted the President's proposed bill, H.R. 7152, to the
House. The legislative history of that version of the bill is particularly important because
the hearings held on H.R. 7152 were the only substantive hearings held on the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. For an explanation of these hearings, see note 16 supra & note 42 infra. The
Senate never held Committee hearings, but note that the version of H.R. 7152 finally sent
back to the House from the Committee was a last-minute draft that revised H.R. 7152. Also
note that the Senate substantially amended the House bill, see text accompanying note 47
infra, and again rewrote the bill just prior to passage. Thus the legislative history consists
only of the floor debates, the procedural machinations, and the House hearings on H.R.
7152. In order to attribute any legislative history to any given part of the bill, one must
trace that provision through the several versions of the legislation to determine whether that
provision was in the then-pending bill and, if so, in what form.
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the Judiciary which then went beyond Kennedy's proposal and re-
ported to the whole Committee a more extensive version of a civil-
rights bill.42 The Committee, however, managed to moderate that pro-
posa143 and the bill that eventually passed the House was similar in
form and content to the original Kennedy proposal. 44
After lengthy political maneuvering, the House bill was heard in
the Senate without reference to a committee. 45 After an eighty-seven
42. The hearings were held from May 8 to August 2, 1963. See note 16 infra. See
also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2391. For a description of those hearings (22 days, 101 witnesses) from the viewpoint
of an opponent of the legislation, see "Additional Views of Hon. George Meader," id. at
2412. The Subcommittee also met in executive session August 14-31. Id. at 2413. The bill
was finally reported on October 2.
43. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appeared before an executive session of the
Committee and argued thatfor both pragmatic and constitutional reasons, the Subcommit-
tee's bill went too far. Kennedy urged the Committee to rewrite the bill in keeping with the
President's original proposal. 1963 Hearings, supra note 16, pt. IV. Note that the testi-
mony is actually before the whole Committee but is included in the Subcommittee tran-
script. Attorney General Kennedy testified that the bill should be rewritten by the
Subcommittee in the following respects. First, he urged that the voting rights in Title I be
limited to federal elections because he was not convinced that there was constitutional
power to regulate state elections. Second, he opposed on constitutional grounds the exten-
sion of Title II from public accommodations in the strict sense to all businesses licensed by
state or local government. Third, he argued that the injunctive power of the new Title III
(missing from the President's bill) should be limited to racial matters, rather than all consti-
tutional rights. Ironically, many of these objections were directed at provisions that ulti-
mately were included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
44. On October 29, 1963, after several weeks of debate, Celler produced a 56 page
substitute draft. Several members of the Committee were later to complain that they had
seen Celler's new draft for the first time only hours before the Committee met; some claimed
not to have read it at all. Debate on the new draft was limited to two minutes--one for the
Chairperson and one for the ranking Republican on the Committee. Both spoke in favor of
the draft. This form of the bill is analyzed in H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2393-2409. But see note 43 supra.
Amended in this hasty manner, the new H.R. 7152 was reported out of Committee and
eventually to the floor of the House on January 30, 1964. After a lively but relatively short
debate, H.R. 7152 was passed by the House on February 10, 1964. H.R. REP. No. 1119,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); (report from Rules Committee) 110 CONG. REc. 1511 (1964). It
has been reported that the Rules Committee reported the bill under the threat of a discharge
petition. See Comment, supra note 17, at 831.
45. Because of the domination of Senate committees by political conservatives it was
unlikely that the House Bill would have survived reference to a committee. The two Mans-
field bills had died in Committee during the first session of the 88th Congress. See note 40
& accompanying text supra. Thus, when the bill was read for the first time, Senator Mans-
field proposed the unusual step of considering H.R. 7152 without reference to a committee, a
procedure which had been used rarely since the inception of the committee system in 1948.
I10 CONG. REc. 2882 (1964). The acting President Pro Tem of the Senate, Senator Metcalf,
accepted the proposal, id. at 2886, whereupon it was debated by the Senate and upheld by a
narrow margin, id. at 6416.
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day floor debate, the longest in the history of the Senate,46 and last
minute redrafting of several, important provisions, the bill passed the
Senate on June 19, 1964.47 After acceptance of the Senate version by
the House,48 it was signed into law by President Johnson on July 2,
1964.49
The final version of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,50 including Title
46. Throughout the debate conservative senators tried to limit the scope and purpose of
the bill by a continuous series of amendments and finally tried to kill it by a filibuster. See
110 CONG. REC. 14443 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
On June 10, 1964, a cloture rule was proposed and carried by a vote of 71-29. 110
CONG. REC. 13327 (1964).
47. 110 CONG. REc. 14511 (1964). The Senate vote was 73-27. By the time the debate
had ended, more than 500 amendments had been proposed. 110 CONG. REc. 15895-96
(1964). The version of H.R. 7152 finally enacted, however, was a compromise "eleventh-
hour" draft written by Senators Humphrey, Dirksen, and Kuchel. The final version incor-
porated some of the amendments but also moderated many of the provisions, particularly
those which related to enforcement activities. For an explanation of the compromise, see
110 CONG. REC. 12706 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). Among other things, the
compromise added the employment exception and several provisions clarifying the proce-
dures to be followed in making determinations of compliance with Title VI. But in general,
Title VI as originally proposed by President Kennedy remained intact. See 110 CONG.
REc. 15896 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
48. When the Senate's version of the bill was returned to the House, it was referred to
the Committee on Rules. For a good summary of the major issues involved in this legisla-
tion and of the legislative history of the bill, see Hearings Before the Committee on Rules on
H.R. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
A one-day hearing was held, and a one-sentence resolution was reported to the floor.
Providingfor the concurrence of the House of Representatives to the Senate Amendment to
HR. 7152, H.R. REP. No. 1527, Committee on Rules, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964). Note
that the chairperson of the committee chose not to sign the report because of his personal
opposition to the bill. After a brief debate, the House accepted the Senate bill, 289-126.
110 CONG. Rac. 15897 (1964).
49. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (see note 50 for codification).
50. Title I (expansion and protection of voting rights in both state and federal elec-
tions), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970)); Title II (prohi-
bition of discrimination in public accommodations and authorization of injunctive action by
a private party or the Attorney General), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1970)); Title III (authorization for independent action by Attorney General
after petition by private party complaining of discrimination in public facilities other than
educational institutions), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 246 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000b
(1970)); Title IV (technical assistance and grants to assist in desegregation; authorization of
suits by Attorney General to enforce rights to education), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 246
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c-9 (1970)); Title V (extension of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 249 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a-1975d
(1970)); Title VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4
(1970)); Title VII (establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the substantive standards defining employment discrimination), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970)); Title VIII (requirement for the Secre-
tary of Commerce to compile registration and voting statistics), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
266 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000f (1970)); Title IX (procedures after removal of civil-rights
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VI, followed the basic scheme of the bills originally filed by President
Kennedy, Representative Celler, and Senator Mansfield.51 Section 601
of the act enacted the substantive policy of Title VI: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Feder-
al financial assistance."52
Section 602 imposed several limitations on the enforcement of Ti-
tle VI, but also provided the primary statutory authority for adminis-
trative action to enforce the policy of nondiscrimination enunciated in
Section 601:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guar-
anty is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
601 with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regula-
tions, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievements of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken. . . .Com-
pliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to
whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportu-
nity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement.
or (2) by any other means authorized by law ... .5
suits from state court to federal court; authorization of Attorney General to intervene in
civil-rights suits), Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 266 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1970)); Title
X (establishment of community relations service), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 267 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000g-2000g-3 (1970)); Title XI (trial by jury in criminal contempt proceed-
ings brought under the law; clarification of validity of state laws covering same subjects;
other miscellaneous provisions), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 268 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000h-2000h-6 (1970)).
51. See notes 38-41 & accompanying text supra.
52. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970)).
53. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 602, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1
(1970)). See also Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 603, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-2 (1970)) (establishing judicial review of administrative decisions made under this
authority); Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 604, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3
(1970)) (prohibiting the exercise of authority under Title VI over employment practices);
Pub. L. No. 88-352, ti. VI, § 605, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1970))
(apparently eliminating from the scope of Title VI any recipient of federal funds by way of
contract of insurance or guaranty); Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 602, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970)) (requirements relating to voluntary compliance; requirement
that all rules, regulations, and orders be cleared by the President; and requirement of notice
to the Senate and House prior to fund termination of any recipient).
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It is readily apparent that the provision of the House bill, and its
predecessors that later became Title VI, was not the sole cause of the
extended controversy over the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. Leg-
islators argued more over those provisions that prohibited discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, enforced voting rights in both federal
and state elections, and prohibited discrimination in employment. In
fact, many of the original bills did not include a Title-VI-type scheme.
Prohibitions of racial discrimination in federally funded activities or
programs appeared for the first time in President Kennedy's own bill
and in his June 1963 message to Congress.5 4 One commentator has
even reported that the Kennedy administration considered the Title VI
provision a "throw in": something that could be compromised in order
to gain support for the rest of the bill. 5 Whatever its original purpose,
and whoever really supported the idea, once the Title VI provision ap-
peared in the Kennedy proposal, it was included in some form in all
subsequent bills, somehow managing to weather the storm for which it
was only partially responsible.
It is even more apparent that eliminating discrimination in the de-
livery of health services was not a primary objective of Title VI or any
of the other provisions of the Civil Rights Act. To the extent that two
years of debate can be characterized and the discussion of Title VI pro-
visions can be separated from other issues, the major hope of propo-
nents, and the principle concern of opponents, concerned the use of
Title VI as an administrative tool to deal effectively with the problem
of school segregation in areas where state and local government had
been uncooperative and the courts ineffective.
Notwithstanding this lesser concern with discrimination in health
services, it is absolutely clear that in both the strict legal sense and the
broad descriptive sense, Congress intended Title VI to prohibit racial
discrimination in all federally funded programs and activities, includ-
ing those for health services. At all points in the legislative process,
references were made to prohibiting discrimination throughout the en-
tire spectrum of federally funded activities with frequent references to
health services, particularly hospital services. 56
54. See notes 37 & 39 supra.
55. Comment, supra note 17, at 831.
56. See 1963 Hearings, supra note 16, at 1830-46 (statement of Dr. Walter J. Lear,
Medical Committee for Human Rights), 2485 (written statement of American Public Health
Association), 2776-77 (letter from Assistant Attorney General Katzenbach to Chairman Cel-
ler enumerating federal programs to be effected by Title VI); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2453, 2472, 2511 (statement of
dissent by Republican minority); 110 CONG. REc. 1538 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Rodino on
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At the time that the final act was passed, no one could have antici-
pated the 1965 enactments of the Medicaid and Medicare programs
and the resultant, massive federal involvement in health care that was
to characterize the late 1960's and early 1970's. Even in 1964, how-
ever, the federal financial involvement in health services was already
substantial, growing annually, and involving many, though not all,
health facilities.57 Simkins had publicized the problem of discrimina-
tion in Hill-Burton facilities, and the finding of discrimination in that
case showed the potential impact of the Title VI concept on the nation's
hospital system.58 Congress was also aware that many health facilities
received federal funds as vendors of services under the Kerr-Mills pro-
gram,59 a limited, welfare-related, health-services program that was the
forerunner to Medicaid.
In short, Title VI and its applications were considered at length
but not in depth. Title VI was the result of a long, hard-fought battle,
but a battle in which political expediency contifnually predominated
over the need for full consideration of the details of the proposals.
Such expediency is understandable when one considers that any further
attempt to study or consider the bills would probably have degenerated
into the kind of rhetorical, overly broad, policy dispute that typified the
two years of debate.
As a result, it is very difficult to rely on legislative history to deter-
mine what many of the specific provisions of the Act were intended to
authorize. In the literal sense the legislative history is fairly straight-
forward. It is clear that the 88th Congress intended Title VI to estab-
lish a policy of nondiscrimination and to authorize an administrative
program to enforce that policy. The intent to extend that policy and
program to health facilities is quite clear, notwithstanding the lesser
the day the House received the committee report on H.R. 7152); 110 CONG. REc. 8622
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman during the Senate floor debate).
57. On Feb. 10, 1964, the same day that the House passed H.R. 7152, President John-
son's "Health Message" was introduced into the House record. HEALTH MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 224, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964),
refprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 2805-09 (1964). The message reported that the federal health
budget for 1964-65 was $5.4 billion, having doubled in eight years, and that the total health
expenditures for the nation in 1964 had been $34 billion, which was six percent of the GNP.
The President proposed a program of health insurance for the aged (later to be called Medi-
care) and an expansion of federal health spending to fund such diverse programs as health-
personnel education and mental-retardation and mental-health services. If made a decade
later, such requests would have seemed ridiculously inadequate. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
58. Remedying the "separate but equal" language of the type declared unconstitutional
in Simkins was one reason given in support of Title VI. 110 CONG. REc. 1658 (1964).
59. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, tit. VI, 74 Stat. 924 (1960)
(amended 1965).
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role those facilities played in the deliberations. The history of the ori-
gin of Title VI and the debate during its enactment, however, give little
guidance either as to the kinds of discriminatory practices that are pro-
hibited or the methods of enforcement that are authorized. Appar-
ently, few legislators actually considered Title VI's impact on health
services beyond the ending of segregation in hospitals and nursing
homes. Little knowledge existed of the various discriminatory prac-
tices incident to segregation or of the proper methods to ensure nondis-
crimination in health facilities. Nonetheless, Congress clearly gave
HEW a broad, albeit undefined, mandate to prohibit discrimination.
After 1964, HEW attempted to apply that mandate to the variety of
programs it funded, including those that financed the delivery of health
services-a field that was on the eve of an unprecedented period of
growth and change.
Initial Enforcement Efforts
With uncharacteristic speed HEW issued the first set of regulations
implementing Title VI in January 1965.60 The regulations interpreted
the applicability of Title VI;61 defined discrimination in terms of spe-
cific activities, going far beyond the narrow concept of discrimination
of the pre-1964 Hill-Burton program;62 described the assurances that
60. 30 Fed. Reg. 35 (1965). Those initial HEW regulations were drafted by a special
interagency committee which included representatives from the Department of Justice and
the Bureau of the Budget. The HEW regulations were used as the model for the Title VI
regulations of other agencies. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEW
AND TITLE VI, A REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION, POLICIES AND
COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HEW
AND TITLE VI]. With some technical amendments, the substantive requirements of the reg-
ulations stayed the same until the amendments of 38 Fed. Reg. 17,978 (1973).
Although HEW proceeded immediately with some Title VI enforcement activities,
President Johnson's original budget request for supplemental funds to cover expenditures
for the fiscal year that had already started was for $13,088,000. Of this $8,000,000 was for
Title IV enforcement (education); no funding was requested for Title VI enforcement. H.R.
Doc. No. 318, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 80.2 (1976) makes these regulations applicable to all recipients of fed-
eral funds. 45 C.F.R. § 80.2(a), however, excludes contracts of insurance or guaranty, as
required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970), which may be relevant to recipient health facilities.
Although the section has been interpreted not to exclude Hill-Burton loan guarantees, see 45
C.F.R. § 80, Appendix A, pt. 2, No. 22, the issue of applicability may be raised when the
1974 revisions to the Hill-Burton program are implemented. Under the new program, loans
and guarantees may be made directly to recipients, instead of through the states. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300 (1974-1977 Supp.).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1976) defines prohibited actions in noninclusive terms. In prac-
tice those definitions, which apply to a variety of health, education, and welfare programs,
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must be executed by recipients of federal funds; 63 and set out proce-
dures for enforcement and monitoring of compliance by recipients. 64
The regulations were, of necessity, generalized in form and appli-
cable to the whole range of health, education, and welfare programs
funded by HEW.6 5 Several statutory provisions were interpreted as
they applied to specific situations (e.g., "in the case of institutions of
higher education"), 66 but in general both the substantive and procedu-
ral requirements were not specifically interpreted.67 Consequently, the
regulations invested HEW officials with broad authority that paralleled
the mandate of Title VI but they gave little guidance to officials in
terms of the application of this authority to specific programs.68
In the decade that followed, the major HEW enforcement efforts
under these regulations were directed toward applying Title VI to pro-
grams that provided funding to elementary and secondary schools. 69
The beginning of the Title VI enforcement program, however, practi-
cally coincided with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid; thus,
have not been specific enough, and HEW has had to issue interpretive guidelines applying
the regulations to specific institutions. See note 68 infra.
63. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4 (1976). Note also the applicability of the assurance to the entire
recipient institution, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80A(d), 80.5(e), 80.8(c), as contrasted with previous HEW
policy under the Hill-Burton program. See text accompanying notes 32 & 33 supra.
64. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6-.11 (1977).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 80.2 (1977). Appendix A is a list of programs to which these regula-
tions apply, but it is noninclusive.
66. The specific provisions tend to anticipate the application of these regulations to
educational institutions, as have subsequent amendments. See 38 Fed. Reg. 17,982 (1973).
67. See text accompanying notes 191-98 infra.
68. In 1966, HEW issued guidelines interpreting the applicability of the substantive
regulations to nursing homes and hospitals. OCR, HEW, GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE
OF NURSING HOMES AND SIMILAR FACILITIES WITH TITLE VI FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964 (issued in revised form November 1969); GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE OF HosPI-
TALS WITH TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (issued in revised form November
1969). It is difficult to define the legal status of those documents because they are not issued
through formal rulemaking which would be governed by the procedural requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1974). At the least, they are OCR's official interpretation of the applica-
tion of Title VI to these facilities.
69. The enforcement of Title VI in elementary and secondary school systems has been
at the forefront of Title VI activity and controversy since its passage. Initially, education
activities and health related enforcement activities were handled by different offices within
HEW. It was only with the consolidation of all HEW Title VI activities into one office, see
text accompanying notes 97-101 infra, that the health facility enforcement program was di-
rectly competing for resources with elementary and secondary education. The issue of pri-
ority within HEW as a whole, however, was never in doubt. Elementary and secondary
education enforcement activity was not only the top priority, many civil rights staff felt it
was the only priority. See HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 33-38.
For a discussion of the early education enforcement efforts, see UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SoUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67 (1967).
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HEW was faced immediately with the need to apply the Title VI regu-
lations to programs that made nearly all hospitals and nursing homes
recipients of federal funds.
Unlike the Hill-Burton program, which had defined the "problem
with health care" as a shortage of available facilities,70 Medicare 7' was
enacted in recognition of the inability of many people, particularly the
elderly, to afford needed medical care.72 Under the scheme outlined in
the federal statute and the initial Medicare regulations, a hospital or a
skilled nursing home must be certified by HEW as having met certain
"conditions of participation, ' 73 must sign an acceptable provider agree-
70. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395pp (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For background on the enact-
ment of Medicare and its initial implementation, see H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, MEDICARE
AND THE HOSPITALS: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as SOMERS]. For the
best legal analysis of the program, see Butler, An Advocate's Guide to the Medicare Program,
8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831 (1975); Butler, Medicare Appeals Procedures. A Constitutional
AnalYsis, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 139 (1975). For a reference on the programming details, see
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) (1968).
72. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1946. See also SOMERS, supra note 71, at 6. Medicare is a federally financed and
administered, health-insurance program for social security recipients. Medicare Part A, 42
U.S.C. § 1395c-1395i (1970), which automatically covers all eligible recipients, pays prima-
rily for hospital and skilled nursing home services, 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (1970). There are
several levels of nursing home care and several definitions of those levels which have been
used throughout the history of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See notes 80 & 114
infra. Medicare Part B, which is optional on the payment of a small monthly premium,
primarily covers physician services, and certain supplementary benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j
(1970).
HEW officials have generally taken the position that private physicians who are partici-
pating providers under Medicare are not covered by Title VI, apparently on the theory that
there is no contractual agreement between the government and the individual physician.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, CLAIMS MANUAL, ch. X, § 10.069 (May 1970)
(revised June 1972). See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 118-19 for a
discussion of this interpretation of the law and indication that OCR is reconsidering its
position.
Peter Holmes, Director of OCR from April 1973 until Spring 1977, testified in 1973 that
physicians participating in Medicaid were within the scope of Title VI, but physicians partic-
ipating in Medicare were not. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 177. This is an extremely
questionable interpretation of the law.
Part A and Part B taken together pay for only a portion of the cost of the "covered"
services. A Medicare recipient has substantial deductible and co-insurance obligations and
may be liable to the provider for the difference between the provider's charge and the
amount of Medicare reimbursement. Medicare also has substantial limitations in the kind
of services covered and the duration of coverage. For details see Butler, An Advocate's
Guide to the Medicare Program, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 831, 833-35 (1975).
73. The substantive standards are set forth for each category of institutional provider in
the Medicare regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1011-1416 (1977). See discusssion of current
process of certification at text accompanying notes 105-24.
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ment relating to reimbursement arrangements, 74 and must execute a
nondiscrimination assurance and a facility compliance report.75 Until
it fulfills these conditions, no facility may receive reimbursement for
services provided to eligible Medicare beneficiaries.
At the same time Medicare was enacted, although with somewhat
less political fanfare,76 Congress enacted the Medicaid program under
which federal funds were made available to those states that chose to
provide a health-benefits program to the poor-primarily welfare re-
cipients.77 In order to participate in the program, a state must meet
74. Social Security Administration, HEW, Form SSA-1561. The agreements are basi-
cally a summary of the facility's obligations with respect to noncovered services, collecting
deductibles, and co-insurance. If HEW finds a facility to be in noncompliance with Title
VI, HEW must presumably go through the termination-of-funding procedures outlined in
the Title VI regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.11 (1976), subject to the procedures for judicial
review at 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. V 1975). See Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d 804, 811
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968). Compliance with Title VI, however, is a
substantive requirement for the initial certification of a hospital or a skilled nursing facility.
20 C.F.R. § 405.1501(d) (1977). Butsee 20 C.F.R. § 405.1901(e) (177).
The Medicaid regulations make no explicit reference to Title VI. However, because
hospitals and skilled nursing facilities must meet the Medicare requirements in order to be
certified for Medicaid, the language cited above would consequently apply to Medicaid par-
ticipants. With respect to intermediate-care facilities, there is no explicit reference to Title
VI in the Medicare regulations or cross reference to it in the Medicare regulations. It could
still be argued that Title VI compliance is a substantive requirement for certification of those
facilities, because the Title VI assurance is one of the documents executed by intermediate
care facilities as part of the certification agreement.
75. In addition to the basic statement of assurance that all institutions had to sign,
HEW 441 (PHS 12/64), compliance report forms were developed for each category of insti-
tutional provider: for hospitals, Medical Facilities Compliance Report (Civil Rights Act Ti-
tle VI), PHS-4867 (2-66), and for skilled nursing homes, Extended Care Facilities (ECF)
Compliance Report (Civil Rights Act Title VI), PHS-4888 (4-66). Those forms requested
statements of policy and data on patients currently in the facility in an attempt to document
Title VI compliance. It is important to note that HEW uses compliance reports only as part
of the initial Medicare certification process and for facilities which are first-time recipients of
federal funds. Medicare facilities are not required to submit the reports on a regular basis.
See text accompanying notes 105-25 infra for a discussion of Medicare certification proce-
dures after the initial phase. Some Medicaid facilities, however, are periodically reviewed.
See text accompanying note 121 infra.
The original forms were revised several times. HEW currently uses Hospital Compli-
ance Report, OS/CR 501; and Compliance Report for Extended Care Facilities, Nursing
Homes, and Other 24 Hour Facilities, OS/CR 502.
76. Medicaid has been described as the "sleeper" provision of the Medicare-Medicaid
legislation because it was a rather brief amendment added to the Medicare bill at a time
when Congress appeared to be more interested in enacting a health-care program for the
elderly. See Stevens & Stevens, Medicaid-Anatomy of a Dilemma, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 348, 348 (1970).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970). For a good legal analysis of the Medicaid pro-
gram, see Butler, The Medicaid Progran Current Statutory Requirement and Judicial
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certain federal requirements78 and offer a minimum range of services,
including hospital and nursing-home services. 79
Unlike Medicare, the federal Medicaid law as initially enacted left
the selection of health providers primarily to the discretion of each par-
ticipating state.80 HEW, therefore, first concentrated its Title VI en-
forcement efforts on the initial certification of Medicare institutions,
leaving enforcement within Medicaid facilities to the states. Only
later, as part of its review of state-agency compliance activities, did
HEW indirectly review Medicaid-provider institutions.8' As a practi-
cal matter, most hospitals and many nursing homes were already under
the direct review of HEW at this time because most facilities that par-
ticipated in Medicaid also participated in Medicare. 82
Medicare was scheduled to go into effect on "M" day, July 1, 1966,
one year after its enactment.83 On that date HEW was faced with the
prospect of administering a program that would reimburse nearly
20,000 health facilities for the variety of services to be provided to
19,000,000 eligible beneficiaries. Special rules and procedures had to
be devised for special types of providers. Financial arrangements had
to be made with a whole variety of institutions.8 4 Ultimately, seven-
teen different, detailed manuals of standards were developed, each cor-
responding to a different category of participant. Understandably, the
Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 7 (1974). For the best general reference on the
program, see MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) (1968).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396d (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See notes 80 and 114 infra for
a discussion of levels of nursing homes.
80. The original federal statute was quite general in defining the standards which the
states had to apply in allowing hospitals and nursing homes to participate in Medicaid. The
initial federal regulations, however, required hospitals participating in Medicaid to meet
Medicare standards. 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(b)(1) (1977) (originally enacted in 1968).
The nursing homes participating in Medicaid were defined differently than under Medi-
care, and the standards which they had to meet were primarily left to each state. In 1972,
Congress amended the federal statute to consolidate the standards for nursing homes under
Medicaid and Medicare, explicitly requiring Medicaid skilled nursing facilities (the new
consolidated term) to meet the same standards as Medicare skilled nursing facilities (with
some minor exceptions). 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (1974). See also note 114 infra.
The states still take primary responsibility for deciding which facilities can participate
in Medicaid and some vestiges of the dual standards remain even though the standards are
in fact the same. This is one cause of the confusion that often defeats attempts at Title VI
enforcement.
81. See text accompanying notes 126-48 infra.
82. The major exceptions were levels of nursing homes that were not covered by Medi-
care but could be covered by Medicaid programs. See note 114 infra.
83. For an account of the political climate, see SOMERS, supra note 7 1, at 1-24.
84. Id. at 28.
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complicated process of provider certification, including the review of
the Title VI assurance forms and facility reports, pushed the HEW bu-
reaucracy to the brink of chaos and encouraged expedient actions and
compromise.85 The Office of Equal Health Opportunity (OEHO) was
created within the Public Health Service and was given the responsibil-
ity of reviewing the executed assurances and reports. 86 HEW at-
tempted, in only a few short weeks, to train a special staff of officers to
identify compliance problems and conduct on-site reviews of noncom-
plying facilities.8 7 Their success was questionable. The United States
Commission on Civil Rights, reviewing OEHO performance during
that initial period, sharply criticized the staff's training and
85. Id. at 87. See also HEW AND TrrLE VI, supra note 60, at 44-47.
86. HEW AND TrrLE VI, supra note 60, at 44; Comment, supra note 17, at 981. Al-
though the Public Health Service was assigned responsibility for the Medicare certification
process, most of the administrative control for the program was exercised by the Bureau of
Health Insurance, Social Security Administration, which was replaced when the Health
Care Financing Administration was formed within HEW in 1977.
In an attempt to coordinate Title VI efforts among various federal agencies during the
initial stages of implementation, the Department of Justice developed "coordination plans"
which outline procedures for monitoring and enforcement of programs receiving federal
funds from more than one federal agency. Under those plans, HEW was delegated respon-
sibility for Title VI monitoring and enforcement activities for educational institutions and
for health facilities funded by some 21 agencies. HEW had the responsibility for Title VI
compliance activities up to the point of formal enforcement action and was required to
maintain a list of all institutions which executed a Title VI agreement. Another responsibil-
ity was the periodic publishing of reports to up-date the list and to indicate noncomplying
facilities. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974, supra note 4, at 690-98. An example of the
original agreement delegating authority to HEW for enforcing Title VI compliance can be
found at 32 Fed. Reg. 2823 (1967). For the periodic reports on compliance activities and
the compliance status of institutions, see HEW, STATUs OF TITLE VI COMPLIANCE, INTER-
AGENCY REPORT (published periodically).
Although the interagency agreements make sense, the orientation towards the type of
recipient rather than the type of program funding can cause problems and even apparent
contradictions when a particular program dictates preferential treatment of minorities, e.g.,
a clinic for migrant workers or native Americans. The HEW forms require an assurance of
nondiscrimination from a facility without any delineation of the exact Title VI responsibili-
ties of the recipient when the funding received requires the recipient to make direct or indi-
rect racial distinctions.
87. A staff of nearly 500 people was hastily assembled, including several hundred peo-
ple temporarily assigned from other HEW programs, medical students who were on summer
internships, and a number of outside consultants. After a three week "crash" civil-rights
training program, this staff spent the summer that followed reviewing the compliance reports
submitted by participating hospitals. By the end of the year, nearly 7,000 hospitals had
been reviewed, and 4,000 on-site visits had taken place. By the fall of 1966, most of the
temporary and summer staff were no longer available. That is of crucial significance to the
initial Medicare certification of nursing homes, because after the review of hospitals a
significantly smaller OEHO had to certify and do Title VI reviews of nursing homes. Nurs-
ing home decisions, therefore, were based almost entirely on the assurances and compliance
reports, and few site visits were involved. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 44-45.
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performance. 88
Of over 4,000 hospitals actually visited by HEW during 1966,89 all
but a few were cleared for participation in Medicare after brief negotia-
tions. Although a few were noticed for hearing and twelve were actu-
ally found ineligible for federal funds, all but two were subsequently
reinstated.90 HEW later claimed that as a result of Title VI enforce-
ment during the initial phases of the Medicare program, nearly all of
the nation's hospitals were committed to a policy of nondiscrimina-
tion.9' That statement was probably true in only the sense that such
policies were adopted, not that they were followed.
By the time HEW shifted its focus from hospitals to nursing
homes, the fledgling OHEO had developed formidable staffing
problems. Consequently, the nursing homes entering the Medicare
program received an even more cursory certification. 92
Many hospitals and nursing homes that signed the assurances were
later found to be in violation of Title VI. They had either openly
maintained policies of direct segregation, or they had continued less
overt but equally discriminatory practices, such as denial of access to
special services. 93 There is little doubt that as a result of Title VI, and
the financial incentives of Medicare reimbursement, many health facili-
ties admitted their first minority patient in the summer of 1966. The
result of this effort was to require the execution of the assurances, not to
require full compliance with Title VI itself.
In addition, many health facilities were allowed to participate in
Medicare under exceptions to the certification requirements.94 Some
facilities opted to qualify only for the exceptions, in order to avoid
88. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 16. See also VI ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT-1974, supra note 4.
89. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 46.
90. Id. at 47.
91. Id. at 46.
92. See note 81 supra. Only about 10% of the nursing home applicants were reviewed
in any depth. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 46.
93. For examples of segregated room assignments and other "subtle" discrimination,
see 1973 HEARINGS, supra note 7, at 41, 45-46, 49-50, 130, 289, 315. See also Comment,
supra note 17, at 983-88.
For a more systematic appraisal of the extent of discrimination in those health facilities,
see the results of the studies conducted by OCR in 1969, text accompanying notes 179-84
infra, and the GAO study of 1972-73, text accompanying notes 185-92 infra.
94. One exception allows emergency services to be provided by noncertified hospitals.
42 U.S.C. § 1395f(d)(1) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 405.1011 (1977). The other exception allows
noncertified facilities to provide services in areas where no other facilities are available. 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(5) (1970 & Supp. V 1976); 20 C.F.R. § 405.1910 (1977).
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compliance with Title VI.95
Ironically, that effort at the beginning of the Medicare program
has been the only serious effort by HEW to monitor the compliance of
all certified health facilities.
Title VI Enforcement in Health Facilities
The initial Medicare enforcement efforts were indicative of the
manner in which Title VI would be enforced against health facilities in
the years that followed. The responsibility for overall supervision of
Title VI enforcement activities was given first to the Assistant Secretary
of HEW, with each of the HEW operating agencies responsible for car-
rying out day-to-day enforcement within its various programs. 96
OEHO was charged with the responsibility for the initial Medicare cer-
tification and Title VI efforts.
After the first fifteen months of the Title VI program, HEW cre-
ated a separate Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within the Office of the
Secretary.97 A Special Assistant to the Secretary and a small staff set
overall policy, handled difficult cases, and exercised general supervi-
sion over all HEW Title VI activities, but the primary day-to-day Title
VI enforcement activities remained the responsibility of the operating
agencies and were coordinated by compliance officers appointed within
each agency. Each of the ten regional office directors designated a spe-
cial assistant for civil rights to advise the director, but to report directly
to OCR.
In 1966, the House Appropriations Subcommittee directed HEW
to centralize all of its Title VI enforcement responsibilities in one of-
fice.98 Consequently, in October 1967, HEW reorganized the Title VI
program99 by dissolving such program units as OEHO and transferring
many staff members of the old units to the newly expanded OCR.
Each region was given a separate civil-rights office and staff to carry
out enforcement programs.1 ° Title VI enforcement responsibilities
95. SOMERS, supra note 71, at 87-88.
96. HEW AND TrrLE VI, supra note 60, at 5. As of that time, HEW had five agencies:
Public Health Service, Office of Education, Social Security Administration, Welfare Admin-
istration, and the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration. The latter two were combined
into Social and Rehabilitative Services in 1967. That basic administrative configuration
stayed the same until 1976. See note 103 & accompanying text infra.
97. HEW AND TrrLn VI, supra note 60, at 7.
98. Id. at 10.
99. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,555 (1967).
100. In general, the staff of an HEW regional program reports to the regional director,
not directly to its Washington counterpart. The regional OCR is a special case and has
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have been consolidated in OCR ever since. The integration of Title VI
responsibilities into normal program operations and the communica-
tion between OCR and the rest of the HEW bureaucracy, however, are
problems that have never been fully resolved.' 0 '
Until recently OCR was divided into several units that carried out,
for particular kinds of recipients, the various civil-rights responsibilities
of OCR, including Title VI enforcement. For example, the Health and
Social Services Division (HSSD) was primarily responsible for enforc-
ing Title VI in both public and private health and welfare institutions,
although the actual enforcement activities were carried out by the staff
of the Health and Social Services Branch (HSSB) in each regional
OCR office. In 1977, following the change in presidential administra-
tions, OCR was once again reorganized. 0 2 Currently, the enforcement
programs are again merged and OCR is organized in functional units
rather than the former divisions concerned with specific subject
areas. '
0 3
The staffing and funding of OCR has grown since 1968, but not at
been able to operate with a fair amount of autonomy. Regional OCR staffs make field
review decisions and decide whether to refer a decision directly to the central OCR in Wash-
ington. Only the Director of OCR, however, has the authority to begin proceedings for the
termination of funds or to refer matters to the Attorney General for judicial action.
101. In March, 1968, then Secretary John Gardner resigned from HEW to join the Ur-
ban Coalition. The Director of OCR, Peter Libassi, and several key staff left OCR in the
next few months to join him. Gardner was succeeded by Wilbur Cohen. Cohen is reported
to have implemented a policy of downgrading civil-rights enforcement on the theory that
racial minorities would be better served in the long run by an overall improvement in fed-
eral health, education, and welfare programs. He even suggested that the responsibility for
civil-rights enforcement be shifted to the Department of Justice. HEW AND TITLE VI,
supra note 60, at 11. See text accompanying note 225 infra.
102. According to the FY 1978 Annual Operating Plan for OCR, OCR's responsibilities
include enforcement of: (1) Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(Supp. V 1975) (sex discrimination in educational institutions); (2) Public Health Service Act
§§ 799A, 855, 42 U.S.C. §§ 295h-9, 298b-2 (Supp. V 1975) (sex discrimination in professional
health schools); (3) Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V
1975) (discrimination against disabled); (4) Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §
6101 (Supp. V 1975) (discrimination based on age); (5) Title VII of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975) (desegregation
of schools); (6) Executive Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.) (amended by Exec.
Order 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70 comp.) (discrimination by government contractors).
HEW, NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, PROPOSED ANNUAL OP-
ERATING PLAN FOR FY 1978, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,823 (1977).
103. There are four functional units in OCR: Office of Administration and Manage-
ment; Office of Program Review and Assistance; Office of Compliance and Enforcement;
and Office of Policy, Planning, and Research. The time and resources allocated to enforce-
ment activities concerning health facilities, at least for the present, are substantially un-
changed. It remains to be seen whether this internal reorganization will result in changes in
the nature or emphasis of Title VI enforcement activities.
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an unusual rate.O4 The real significance of OCR staff size and budget
lies in the unequal division of resources among the various OCR re-
sponsibilities: the enforcement of Title VI is strongly emphasized for
elementary and secondary schools and much less emphasized for
health facilities. HSSD, therefore, has always had a relatively small
staff. It is largely because of the small proportion of resources allo-
cated to health-facility enforcement programs that OCR has tended to
rely on an enforcement program for health facilities that focuses on
certain aspects of compliance while ignoring others.
OCR fulfills its Title VI responsibilities to health facilities prima-
rily through four activities: (1) requiring Title VI assurances from
health facilities certified for participation in the Medicare program; (2)
requiring state agencies to submit Title VI compliance plans describing
state enforcement activities; (3) investigating complaints and noncom-
plying recipients identified by assurance documentation; (4) conducting
occasional special studies.
Medicare Certification and Review
The certification of health facilities for participation in Medicare
and Medicaid, combined with the traditional licensing of health facili-
ties by state agencies105 and accreditation by a variety of private and
quasi-governmental bodies, 06 has resulted in a complicated, but only
104. In 1978, OCR is budgeted for 1102 positions. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,824 (1977). The
legal work, which includes handling termination hearings of the OCR, is done by the Office
of General Counsel, but the staff used for this purpose is paid for out of the OCR budget.
105. Since the late 1940's, almost all states that require a facility to comply with various
health and safety standards have maintained licensing programs for health facilities.
Worthington & Silver, Regulation of Qualiy of Care in Hospitals: The Needfor Change, 35
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 305, 308 (1970). In many regards state licensing standards are
similar to the federal certification standards, although the federal standards deal more di-
rectly with the quality of the services while state licensing standards traditionally have fo-
cused on fire safety and the structural adequacy of the facilities. Id. at 309. See also A.
SOMERS, HOSPITAL REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY (1968). Recently,
however, some states have attempted to enforce standards that are more directly related to
patient care, e.g., patient-staff ratios.
Licensing standards and their enforcement can be coordinated with the certification of
Medicaid and Medicare facilities and with their accreditation by private agencies. For ex-
ample, in many states, the survey of a hospital for purposes of certification may be part of a
licensing inspection, and is conducted by or in conjunction with the accreditation by the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). See note 106 infra.
106. A number of accrediting agencies exist for a variety of purposes. For example, the
American Medical Association has an accreditation program for evaluating and approving
health facilities for internship and residency programs. The most important agency, how-
ever, is the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) which, in addition
to its role as a nationally recognized accrediting body for hospitals, has been given a signifi-
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partially effective web of state and federal government monitoring and
control of the quality of medical care delivered in health facilities. 0 7
Conspicuously absent from this web, however, is any serious affirma-
tive effort to identify and eliminate racial discrimination in accordance
with Title VI.
State agencies operating under contractual agreements with HEW
make initial and periodic Medicare certification reviews which include
surveying hospitals for compliance with the Medicare conditions of
participation. 108 The findings of the state survey agency are then for-
warded to HEW for final certification. HEW may accept hospitals ac-
credited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH) as in compliance with the federal conditions, with some excep-
tions.10 9 In all cases Medicare hospitals are subject to periodic surveys,
cant role in the certification process. Although lack of accreditation theoretically affects
only the prestige of a facility and its standing in the eyes of its professional peers, JCAH
accreditation has become tantamount to Medicare and Medicaid certification. See text ac-
companying note 109 infra. For a good history of the JCAH, see Worthington & Silver,
Regulation of Quality of Care in Hospitals: The Needfor Change, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 305 (1970).
107. In recent years, government control of health facilities has been extended to include
a variety of attempts to control cost and distribution of health services, e.g., certificate of
need or rate-setting programs. At the federal level, a number of regulatory controls have
been imposed on health facilities participating in Medicaid and Medicare, including controls
on cost and reviews of the adequacy and quality of the services rendered under the federal
programs. The Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c (Supp. V 1975), which was enacted by the 1972 Social Security Amendments is
probably the best example of these programs and of the way quality controls have been
merged with controls on cost and capital expenditure. For a general background, see K.
WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH (1976).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (Supp. V 1975); 20 C.F.R. § 405.1902 (1977). This must be
the same agency that does the survey and evaluation of providers for participation in the
Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975). The only real difference be-
tween Medicare certification and Medicaid certification is that when a survey is done for
purposes of Medicare (or Medicare and Medicaid) certification, the results are forwarded to
HEW for the final certification decision. Under Medicaid, the final decision is made by the
state agency that administers the Medicaid program, which may be a different agency than
the one conducting the certification survey. For example, the survey may be done by the
state department of public health, but Medicaid may actually be administered by the state
welfare agency.
For requirements for certification, see text accompanying notes 99-102 supra. When a
state imposes higher standards on a hospital or nursing home under the Medicaid program,
HEW must use those higher standards for certification of Medicare facilities. 20 C.F.R. §
405.1901(d) (1977).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (Supp. V 1975); 20 C.F.R. § 405.1901(b) (1977). Exceptions
exist for the conditions requiring utilization review, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(6) (1970), and
institutional planning, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(z) (Supp. V 1975), because there are no compara-
ble JCAH standards. An exception also exists for any other requirement that HEW may
enact which is higher that the accreditation standards.
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including extensive on-site inspections, by either JCAH or the state sur-
vey agency. They are also frequently visited by state or federal agen-
cies which verify JCAH findings, investigate complaints, and review or
identify deficiencies.
A hospital that participates in Medicaid but not Medicare is re-
viewed under virtually the same procedures and under the same federal
conditions of participation.' 10 It is subject to the same inspections, but
the final decision to certify a Medicaid provider lies with the state
Medicaid agency, not HEW."1'
Not only are hospitals subject to certification and recertification
survey procedures, but also they must periodically submit data con-
cerning correction of deficiencies, results of utilization review, staffing,
and other details of day-to-day operations relating to the standards of
compliance to state surveying agencies. Additionally, they must sub-
mit patient-service and cost data regularly to both state and federal
government agencies as part of the cost determination and reimburse-
ment procedures.' 12 Yet despite data collection, monitoring, and peri-
odic surveys, there is no attempt to monitor hospitals on a regular basis
for compliance with Title VI. Unless there is a complaint filed, a
change in certification status, or another reason to investigate a particu-
lar hospital, after initial certification no attempt is made by HEW to
collect any further data, monitor compliance, or validate the assurance
on a regular basis, despite ample and convenient opportunities to do
SO.113
Prior to 1972, the federal statute empowering HEW to enact certification standards
read: "[S]uch other requirements may not be higher than the comparable requirements pre-
scribed for the accreditation of hospitals by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hos-
pitals. . . "' Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(e)(8), 79 Stat.
286 (repealed 1972). HEW interpreted this provision and 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb to mean that
all accredited hospitals must be certified and that HEW could impose no standards on ac-
credited hospitals other than the exceptions listed above. The repeal of the quoted language
now allows HEW to impose higher standards. The federal regulations, however, stil indi-
cate that, except for the utilization and institutional planning requirements, an accredited
hospital will be certified automatically as a Medicare provider, although HEW claims the
right to inspect or validate an accredited facility. 20 C.F.R § 405.1901(b) (1977).
110. Although the Medicaid statute requires only that each state establish and maintain
standards for participating institutions, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(9) (Supp. V 1975), the federal
regulations require Medicaid hospitals to meet the Medicare conditions of participation, 42
C.F.R. § 449.10(b)(1) (1977). Theoretically, if a facility participates in both programs, the
certification decision and Title VI review are done by HEW. In practice, the division of
functions is not always observed. See note 122 infra.
I 11. See note 108 supra.
112. See 42 C.F.R. § 450 (1977); 20 C.F.R. § 405.400-525 (1977). See generally H.
MCCORMICK, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES (1977).
113. Although OCR does some direct reviews of Medicare facilities, these reviews are
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Nursing homes1 14 are certified for participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs in a manner similar to that described above for
hospitals. There are, however, slight differences in the procedures and
the standards for nursing home certification: nursing homes are gener-
ally subjected to stricter standards and closer review.' 5 It is also im-
portant to note that participation in Medicare and, particularly,
Medicaid is very important to nursing homes because these govern-
ment programs provide such a large proportion of nursing home
patients. 116
conducted usually only in response to complaints, and the actual number of reviews is quite
small. See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, jupra note 4, at 166-69. The rigor of those
reviews, even when they are intended to be full-scale investigations, is not impressive. For
example, in 1970, OCR identified the Michigan Masonic Home, a participant in the Medi-
care program, as open only to Masons and their wives, thus excluding blacks and other
minorities. Although it is clear under OCR's interpretation of the law that this is a violation
of Title VI, no enforcement proceedings were ever initiated and negotiations between OCR
and the home went on for well over four years. See id. at 172.
114. Prior to the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 7, 26, 42 U.S.C.), both nursing homes and "extended care
facilities" were covered under Medicaid, with separate definitions and separate requirements
for participation for each, although both terms basically referred to a facility that provides
continuous nursing service. In addition, "intermediate care facilities," which offer a less
intensive level of care, were available under another federal welfare program, but not under
Medicaid or Medicare. In 1972, amendments made "skilled nursing facilities" available
under both programs and made the requirements for participation under the two programs
virtually the same. It also included intermediate-care facilities as a service covered under
Medicaid. See Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 246, 86 Stat. 1424-25 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1395x, 1396a (Supp. V 1975)); Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 278, 86 Stat. 1453-54 (1972) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a, 1320b, 1320b-1, 1395f, 1395x, 1395aa, 1395cc, 1395mm, 1395nn, 1396a,
1396b, 1396d, 1396h, 1396i (Supp. V 1975)). For a further discussion of the details of serv-
ice coverage of Medicare and Medicaid, see sources cited in notes 71 § 77 supra.
115. See 42 C.F.R. § 449.10(b)(4) (1977); 42 C.F.R. § 450.23 (1977). For example, nurs-
ing homes are certified for a maximum of 12 months, but may be certified for even shorter
periods of time where appropriate factors, such as past deficiencies, exist. 20 C.F.R. §
405.1904(b) (1977). A skilled nursing facility which participates in Medicaid but not Medi-
care, is surveyed by the same agency and after 1972 has had to meet the same conditions of
participation as a Medicare facility in order to be certified as a Medicaid provider. Interme-
diate care facilities that participate in the Medicaid program are certified in a manner that is
virtually identical to that of skilled nursing homes and must meet both state and federal
standards.
116. The nursing home industry as it exists today was in large part created by the enact-
ment of Medicaid and Medicare. Prior to 1964, the number of nursing homes was quite
small. When Medicare and Medicaid created funding of certain categories of nursing
homes, see notes 107 & 142 infra, they stimulated a rapid growth in the nursing home indus-
try such that the cost of both programs due to reimbursement for nursing home services was
much higher than originally anticipated. For background, see Medicare and Medicaid-
Problems, Issues, and Alternatives, Report of the staff to the Committee on Finance, U.S.
Sen., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
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As in the case of hospitals, state survey agencies, both initially and
periodically thereafter, monitor those skilled nursing facilities that par-
ticipate in the Medicare program for compliance with the conditions of
participation. The agencies report their findings to HEW for final cer-
tification. Although a skilled nursing home may participate in Medi-
caid without participating in Medicare, the facility is surveyed by the
same agency that surveys Medicare homes, 117 and since 1972, the
Medicaid and Medicare conditions of participation have been identi-
cal.118 All participating nursing homes are surveyed at least once a
year (including an on-site inspection) and are required to submit peri-
odic state and federal reports concerning continuing compliance with
the certification standards. They must also submit the service and cost
data required by the reimbursement agreements.
Since the inception of the Title VI program, state agencies ad-
ministering Medicaid have been responsible for requiring that skilled
nursing homes execute the initial assurance 1 9 and complete the initial
compliance report.120 They must also annually review each nursing
home participating in Medicaid to assure compliance with Title VI,121
although a state agency is allowed the option of negotiating a less fre-
quent review of each facility with the regional OCR. For nursing
homes participating in Medicare, the same initial Title VI forms are
executed and forwarded to the state agency under contract with HEW
to do certification reviews,1 22 but there are no comparable annual Title
117. There is no accrediting agency comparable to the JCAH for nursing homes; there-
fore surveys and inspections are carried out by the state agencies either as part of the Medi-
caid program or under contract to HEW for Medicare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa (Supp. V 1975).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(28) (Supp. V 1975); see note 108. The only major difference
between Medicaid and Medicare certification procedures is whether the state agency or
HEW has the final certification authority. Also, if a state chooses to impose higher stand-
ards for Medicaid skilled nursing homes, HEW must apply them for Medicare certification.
20 C.F.R. § 405.1901(d) (1977). Since 1970, it has been a federal requirement that all skilled
nursing facilities participating in Medicaid or Medicare meet the standards of the Life
Safety Code, published every three years by the National Fire Protection Association. 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(j)(13) (Supp. V 1975).
119. HEW Form 441.
120. FS-5087 (11-66) Nursing Home Compliance Report (For Use by State Agencies
Administering Public Assistance Plans) (similar in substance to PHS-4888, supra note 75).
121. HEW State Letter 937, Nov. 17, 1966. State letters are policy statements in the
form of letters to agencies administering health or welfare programs. They announce
amendments to the handbook of administrative rules and guidelines, HEW Handbook of
Public Assistance Administration. The handbook is distributed to those agencies and is
amended periodically.
122. As with hospitals, final certification is by the Public Health Service, HEW, not by
the state agency. Similarly, the regional OCR reviews the Title VI form submitted by
Medicare facilities and, theoretically, by facilities applying for participation in both the
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VI reviews or inspections of Medicare nursing homes unless the facili-
ties also participate in Medicaid.123 Although these monitoring proce-
dures for Medicaid nursing homes represent a more vigorous attempt
to ensure compliance with Title VI, there is at least some question as to
whether these annual reviews have actually been carried out. 124 Fur-
thermore, with regard to both hospitals and nursing homes, little effort
has been made to use certification activities as a basis for effective en-
forcement of Title VI compliance. 125
State Agency Compliance Reviews
OCR's approach to the enforcement of Title VI in health facilities
has always relied on state agencies for direct monitoring activities.
OCR continues to take responsibility for the initial review and moni-
toring of Medicare facilities, but since the initial phase of certification
of Medicare providers, 126 this has required only a minimum of effort,
particularly since OCR does not monitor these facilities on a regular
basis. 127
In addition to monitoring Title VI compliance of Medicaid health
facilities, each state agency administering HEW-funded programs128
must also execute a statement of compliance similar to the statement of
assurance required of private recipients of HEW funds. 129 The state-
ment of compliance must list all programs receiving federal funds, de-
scribe the methods of administration by which each agency will insure
that the assurance of nondiscrimination is carried out, list the programs
that are not in compliance with the Title VI requirements, and include
a detailed timetable for achieving compliance. 130
Medicaid and Medicare programs. In practice there is often confusion, and a facility may
find itself being evaluated for Title VI compliance by two different agencies. State and
federal officials have had problems sorting out their responsibilities with regard to facilities
participating in more than one program. See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note
4, at 161 n.407.
123. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
124. See text accompanying notes 133-37 infra.
125. See text accompanying notes 206-11 infra.
126. See text accompanying notes 83-95 supra.
127. The number of hospitals has stabilized in recent years and there are few new prov-
iders applying for initial certification.
128. There are over 250 agencies in the various states administering these programs.
The state compliance plans are supposed to include all recipients from all sources of funding
and, thus, the plan developed by a state health agency could be incredibly complicated and
include a vast array of individual and institutional recipients.
129. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4 (1976).
130. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 21. Obviously these documents, if com-
pleted, are enormously important to the public as well as state and federal government.
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By 1968, OCR had apparently received executed assurances and
some sort of compliance plan from all state agencies administering fed-
erally-funded health and welfare programs.13' In the years following,
a significant portion of the resources of OCR was devoted to a review
of the adequacy of these plans, a review that even OCR admitted was
not completed until recently. 32 The ostensible purpose of this review
was to ensure that the methods of administration described in the plans
were being implemented, but the real purpose was to determine
whether the plans themselves were adequate or, in some cases, com-
plete. From the deficiencies and problems that were encountered it is
clear that this review was actually the first time that many of these doc-
uments were closely read by OCR or that the documentation and Title
VI assurance were taken seriously by the state agencies. 133 Admittedly
OCR's enforcement of similar compliance plans with regard to elementary and secon-
dary schools and institutions of higher education has generated a great deal of legal and
political controversy. The enforcement of the requirements with regard to agencies ad-
ministering Medicaid and other health programs has been uncontroversial. 45 C.F.R. §
80.4(c) & (d) (1976). See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4; 45 C.F.R. §
80.4(d) (1976). See also Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42 (1967).
131. Early in the program, Alabama refused to sign the assurance on the ground that it
could not carry out the kind of enforcement activities required by the methods of adminis-
tration or implied by the assurance. The state agency even admitted that many of the public
and private institutions receiving federal funds through the state, including vendors of
health services, practiced racial discrimination. In that case HEW instituted formal admin-
istrative proceedings and eventually issued an order to terminate funding. Alabama sought
relief from the Court of Appeals, which upheld HEW's authority to require nondiscrimina-
tion assurances, but watered down some of the implications of Title VI. Gardner v. Ala-
bama, 385 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968). See generally
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on the Proposed Cutoff of Welfare Funds to
Alabama, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
132. Most of the initial reviews had been completed by 1971. UNITED STATES COMMIS-
SION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESS-
MENT 310-11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT]. By
September 1974, only Hawaii and Alaska reviews were not completed. VI ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 153.
133. The United States Commission on Civil Rights and other independent civil rights
groups have been quite critical of the adequacy of the state compliance plan reviews. See,
ag., letter from chairperson of Health Task Force of the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, reprinted in VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 152. Many states
made certification compliance decisions for Medicaid facilities based only on paper docu-
mentation and did no on-site inspections even though required to do so under the 1966 state
letter. See note 121 supra. In 1973, at least 16 states had no Title VI certification process at
all and many had no regular monitoring activities. Overall, the OCR reviews showed com-
pliance by states to be minimal, yet OCR has never required state agencies to report any
compliance-related data on a regular basis. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 209. See also
California health agency and other examples cited at text accompanying notes 136-140
infra. For a defense of the quality of these reviews, see note 134 infra. The 1974 report has
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there were a few, sample checks of health facilities receiving federal
funds to verify the declarations in the state-agency plans, but in general
the review was of the agency and its plan, not of the actual facilities or
institutions themselves.' 34 After the initial review of a state agency
and its plan, the regional OCR staff made recommendations to the
stage agency. This typically resulted in negotiations followed by more
recommendations, followed by more negotiations. The process often
took months or years and still continues in some cases.' 35
The review of the state health agency in California136 is illustra-
tive. A review of the state agency's compliance plan in 1971 indicated
that California had done little more than execute an assurance. 37
There was no organized system of on-site inspections or annual reviews
of Medicaid facilities for Title VI compliance. 38 There was even evi-
dence that some facilities had not been required to execute the Title VI
assurance. The regional OCR's original action was simply to request
voluntary compliance by the agency. In December 1972, after unsuc-
cessful negotiations, the regional office recommended to OCR in Wash-
ington that enforcement action be initiated by means of a lawsuit or
fund termination. OCR responded that formal action would be pre-
mature. 39 It was not until April 1973 that the state agency received
so many examples of pro forma compliance by state agencies that it is hard to believe that
those state agencies were even acting in good faith. See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974,
supra note 4.
134. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 128 (testimony of Peter E. Holmes, former
Director of OCR). However, Holmes also testified that since 1968, 3,300 nursing homes and
hospitals were reviewed by OCR, implying that many of those were in conjunction with the
state-agency reviews. See also id. at 316-17 (Holmes letter to the Subcommittee expanding
on his remarks).
135. See text accompanying notes 136-40 infra and note 141 infra.
136. The California Department of Health Care Services administered the Medicaid
program (called Medi-Cal) in California. It had an agreement with the California Depart-
ment of Public Health to perform the facility certification reviews as part of that depart-
ment's administration of the state's licensing program. Those California executive agencies
were later reorganized into a larger Department of Health within which separate divisions
administered the Medicaid (Medi-Cal) and licensing programs. The compliance-plan nego-
tiations were conducted first with the Department of Health Care Services and later with the
Department of Health. As of 1977, the California legislature was considering a further
reorganization and the division of responsibility undoubtedly will be realigned.
137. See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 158 n.395. See also id. at
158-60 nn.395-401; 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 213-15.
138. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 158 n.395.
139. Id. at 160. Voluntary compliance is encouraged by the spirit and letter of the Title
VI regulations. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6, 80.8 (1977). Yet no reading of the regulations requires
or permits the months of negotiations, exchanges of letters, and inaction that some of those
situations entailed. See also Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975) (judi-
cial criticism of OCR's emphasis on voluntary compliance).
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formal notice of the deficiencies in its compliance plan. No formal
enforcement activities were initiated, however, and the negotiations be-
tween the state agency and OCR still continue. 140 Similar situations
exist and have existed in a number of states.141
Obviously, one of the major reasons that these reviews take so long
and are subject to such criticism is the recurring problem of inadequate
staffing and resources. 42 However, the shortcomings of the review
procedure are complex, and much responsibility can be attributed to
the manner in which the Title VI program has been carried out. OCR
has never developed clear standards for state compliance plans which
can be used in review activities or referred to by private parties. 143 It
has issued a model statement of compliance, 44 but this statement con-
tains little more than an agreement to abide by the law. There are no
guidelines in the model statement as to what should be included in the
methods of administration or in the time tables for individual program
compliance. There is a draft set of guidelines for compliance plans,
termed "methods of administration,"' 4 5 but they have never been for-
mally issued, although they are unofficially circulated and provide a
starting point for individual negotiations with state agencies. 146 OCR
has announced the intention to issue guidelines in final form twice, but
they have never been issued.147 OCR has also expressed the intention
to implement a data-collection system to monitor state compliance rou-
140. See letter from Ted Scott, Civil Rights Office, Department of Health, State of Cali-
fornia (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
141. Other examples occurred in such diverse states as Louisiana, Michigan, and Indi-
ana. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 161-62. In Louisiana, the state
health department claimed, among other things, that it did not have the staff to do Title VI
certification reviews. The regional OCR allowed the agency to rely on the OCR Medicare
reviews, despite the fact that Medicare reviews are done only on initial certification, and not
periodically thereafter.
142. The failure to take enforcement actions can only be related to the staffing of the
Office of General Counsel, HEW, where three or four people usually handle all OCR
health-related legal work. Many of the "horror" stories illustrating lack of aggressive en-
forcement can be explained by the backlog of work in the Office of General Counsel. See,
g., ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT, supra note 126, at 316, 322.
143. See notes 119-21 and accompanying text supra.
144. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 146.
145. Id. at 147.
146. Id. at 147-48. Originally, there was also a handbook for compliance officers which
described elements of a state compliance plan prepared for HEW by the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights. It is far too general in most respects but much more helpful than
the federal regulations. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPLIANCE OF-
FIcER'S MANUAL: A HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1966).
147. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 144.
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tinely. 148 So far this has not been done either.
Reviews of state compliance plans are lengthy and seldom effect
substantial change in the states' efforts. One thing these state reviews
do reveal is that the state agencies responsible for enforcing Title VI in
health and welfare programs are not making a serious effort to enforce
Title VI or even to monitor compliance.
Investigation of Complaints
In addition to securing assurances from direct recipients of HEW
funding and conducting reviews of the compliance plans of state agen-
cies administering federal health programs, OCR also investigates indi-
vidual complaints of discrimination made against recipient health
facilities. As is the case with its other activities, OCR has been less
than successful in carrying out its responsibility.
Complaints against health facilities received by OCR are for-
warded to the appropriate regional office. In some states the regional
office refers complaints to the appropriate state agency, but this practice
varies greatly from region to region and depends on the type of com-
plaint involved and the confidence that HEW has in the particular state
agency. 149
In all cases, some kind of investigation must be conducted.15 0 If
the regional office determines that a complaint cannot be resolved in-
formally or through negotiation, it recommends to OCR that enforce-
ment action be undertaken. The director of OCR and the Office of
General Counsel review all recommendations prior to further action.
Usually after a long period of time, another attempt is made to secure
voluntary compliance. If this attempt fails, either termination pro-
ceedings are initiated, or the matter is referred to the Department of
Justice. '5 1
Immediately after the enactment of Title VI, there were many
complaints to OCR about health-facility violations of Title VI,152 but
148. Id. at 197-98, 201.
149. See, e.g, HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 31; ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A
REASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at 308; VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at
181.
150. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(c) (1977). But see proposals to amend this regulation, note 167
infra.
151. 45 C.F.R. § 80.8(a) (1977). The same basic procedure would be used if a compli-
ance problem were generated by a state compliance plan, a special study, a review of assur-
ance, or compliance documentation.
152. Prior to 1968, complaints about discrimination in health facilities were reported to
be coming in to HEW at a rate of two or three a week. In fact, the Health and Welfare
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since 1968, there have been relatively few.153 It is difficult to tell ex-
actly how many complaints have been received: OCR does not compile
this data, and complaints are forwarded to the central OCR only when
enforcement action is recommended. Such a recommendation is not
made until after an investigation and the subsequent failure of infor-
mal intervention. In 1973, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
study showed that some regional offices had received only a handful of
complaints in the preceeding five years.154 In 1974, a study by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights reported that OCR had re-
ceived 300 complaints against health facilities nationwide, with the
number varying greatly from region to region.1 55 That study also
found that complaint investigation occupied only about ten percent of
the total time spent on health-related enforcement activities. 56
This situation contrasts with the large number of complaints OCR
receives against other programs and institutions. OCR recently an-.
nounced that all Title VI complaints-primarily complaints against ed-
ucational institutions-rose by 450% from 1969 to 1974,157 and that by
1976 it had a backlog of 3,025 complaints and expected 2,455 more in
1978.158 It is not clear why the number of complaints against health
facilities has declined while the number of complaints against other
programs and institutions has increased. Apparently, discrimination
in health facilities still exists.159 Perhaps the public, like OCR, is more
prone to act against completely segregated facilities than to complain of
the more subtle forms of discrimination that characterize health-facility
activities today.
Branch (later to become HSSD) used the volume of health-related complaints to justify the
few welfare enforcement activities undertaken during that period. HEW AND TITLE VI,
supra note 60, at 30.
153. Several factors may account for the small number of complaints against health fa-
cilities. Most consumers of health services have never heard of OCR or of the Title VI
enforcement program, nor could they be expected to understand the variety of governmental
and quasi-governmental agencies that monitor health facilities. Many people do not even
understand that most private facilities will accept a Medicaid or Medicare card; they believe
these cards can be used only at public facilities. Furthermore, people seeking hospital or
nursing-home care are usually more concerned with basic survival than enforcement of their
civil rights.
154. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 209-18.
155. One hundred fifty of these complaints were against hospitals, eighty were against
other health institutions, and the remainder were against welfare agencies. VI ENFORCE-
MENT EFFoRT-1974, supra note 4, at 180.
156. Id.
157. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,149 (1975).
158. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,824 (1977). For an explanation of this announcement, see note 167
infra.
159. See notes 178-92 & accompanying text infra.
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As with their number and frequency, the quality of complaint in-
vestigations against health facilities seems to vary greatly from region
to region. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has fre-
quently criticized the slowness and inefficiency of OCR in handling
these complaints, 160 although it has occasionally praised the conduct
and value of individual investigations. 161 Moreover, the few com-
plaints received against health facilities do not seem to bring the atten-
tion of OCR to the kind of discrimination that represents the key issues
in Title VI enforcement. 62 Most of the complaints appear to involve
either peripheral issues 163 or the kind of individual situations that lend
themselves to resolution by negotiation and OCR has thus had to bring
few formal compliance actions against health facilities. 64 The evi-
dence indicates that race discrimination and Title VI enforcement are
still issues with regard to health facilities, 65 albeit more complex issues
than those presented by the overt segregation that existed before
1966.166 Complaints, like the other catalysts of enforcement, however,
apparently do not raise these issues. 67
160. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 60, at 30-31; VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974,
supra note 4, at 182-85. If a shortage of resources limits OCR's ability to investigate com-
plaints, initial responsibility for investigations can always be shifted to state agencies, at least
for complaints against Medicaid facilities.
161. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 183.
162. See text accompanying notes 193-98 infra.
163. For example, OCR has taken actions against health facilities administered by fra-
ternal organizations. See note 108 supra.
164. Between 1966 and November 1968, 54 medical institutions were cited for noncom-
pliance; 16 were actually terminated, but 14 were eventually reinstated. From November
1968 to 1972, no new proceedings were instituted. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 206.
165. See text accompanying notes 193-98 infra.
166. See text accompanying notes 176-93 infra.
167. Even OCR has indicated a dissatisfaction with the complaint mechanism, finding it
unlikely to raise important problems and time consuming for the staff. The Civil Rights
Commission reported that in 1974, the OCR intended to emphasize in-depth studies rather
than complaint investigation as a means of identifying critical issues. VI ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 187. In June 1975, OCR formally proposed changes in the
federal regulations that would relieve it of the requirement of investigating all complaints
and would make other changes in the administration of OCR's enforcement activities. 40
Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1975). The time for comments on this proposal was later extended. 40
Fed. Reg. 45,442 (1975). In May 1976, those proposed changes were withdrawn, and OCR
issued a statement outlining the problems in handling complaints and soliciting further pub-
lic comments. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,394 (1976).
Because of the change in administration and OCR leadership after the 1976 elections,
there has been no further action on the regulations. The FY1978 Annual Operating Planfor
OCR indicated that OCR intended to reorganize complaints procedures and use 55% of its
time investigating complaints (all programs). HEW, NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY
ASSISTED PROGRAMS, PROPOSED ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR FY 1978, 42 Fed. Reg.
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In-Depth Studies
In addition to the enforcement activities outlined above, OCR car-
ries out its general responsibility to enforce Title VI in health and wel-
fare programs through studies of particular problems and programs.168
That activity has been particularly important to OCR since 1973, when
the initial round of state-agency compliance reviews was finally com-
pleted. 169 In each annual enforcement plan since 1973, OCR has out-
lined a series of studies to be performed as part of the overall
monitoring and enforcement efforts. For example, a sample study of
nursing home referral practices was conducted in 1973170 and a study
of site selection by health facilities was proposed in the 1978 plan.1 71
The description of these reviews in the 1978 plan172 indicates that fu-
ture studies will document Title VI compliance by categories of recipi-
ents. Previous OCR studies have attempted to isolate the causes of
discrimination. 173
Title VI Enforcement in Health Facilities: Ten Years Later
The reason Title VI enforcement in health facilities has drawn so
little controversy and has been overshadowed by the enforcement of
Title VI in the field of education could be simply that in either absolute
or relative terms racial discrimination in health facilities is not an im-
39,823, 39,824-25 (1977). Apparently all complaints will still be investigated-sooner or
later.
A good, well-publicized complaint system would be a valuable supplement to other
more systematic data collection; it should not, however, become a substitute for data gather-
ing or compliance monitoring. See Tomlinson & Mashow, The Enforcement of Federal
Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestionsfor Benficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv.
600, 639 (1972).
168. The term "in-depth reviews" is used by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights in its 1974 report. See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 177. See
also 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 144 (testimony of Peter Holmes). In the FY 1978 An-
nual Operating Plan, the OCR includes this sort of activity under "compliance reviews."
HEW, NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS, PROPOSED ANNUAL OP-
ERATING PLAN FOR 1978, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,823, 39,824-25 (1977). Actually OCR does a
variety of studies and this categorization of their activities is fairly descriptive but not com-
pletely definitive. See, e.g., studies of individual policy guidelines referred to by Holmes in
1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 161.
169. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
170. For a summary of this and other in-depth reviews in 1973 and a discussion of the
results of these reviews, see VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 177-79. See
also 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 148-71 (testimony of Peter Holmes) (citing factors to be
considered when conducting reviews).
171. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,824-25 (1977).
172. Id at 39,824.
173. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 179.
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portant problem. The policies of racial segregation or exclusion main-
tained by the health facilities of previous decades seem to have been
eliminated either in the early years of Title VI enforcement or through
the monitoring of certification since that time. 174 Virtually all hospi-
tals and nursing homes now execute nondiscrimination agreements 175
and few cases of overt discrimination have been identified. The low
priority OCR gives to enforcement activities in health facilities would
be entirely justified if the low number of complaints made to the
agency responsible for enforcing Title VI were an accurate measure of
the frequency or magnitude of racial discrimination. 176
At this point, however, two important and disturbing observations
can be made with regard to the continued existence of substantial racial
discrimination in health facilities. First, there is very little data on
which to base an evaluation of the problem. 177 Second, what evidence
does exist indicates little change since 1967, after the integration of
health facilities that occurred incident to the initial Medicare certifica-
tion efforts. 178 After 1966, the requirements of Title VI and the eco-
nomic incentives of Medicaid and Medicare meant that hospitals and
nursing homes could no longer maintain open policies of racial segre-
gation or overtly exclude minorities from their services. Evidence in-
dicates, however, that the nondiscrimination agreements are not being
fully enforced and that racial discrimination in a variety of forms con-
tinues to be a problem.
In 1969, OCR sent questionnaires to all hospitals and nursing
homes participating in the Medicare program. The questionnaires
were similar to the compliance reports utilized in the Medicare-facility
application process. 179 The results showed that on the day reported
seventy-seven percent of the hospitals had at least one minority patient,
representing an increase of twenty-four percent over the number served
prior to Medicare. The data also indicated that thirty percent more
minority patients were being served overall, and that sixty-one percent
more hospitals had minority physicians on their staffs. The results also
showed eighty-two percent more nursing homes were serving minori-
ties, and the number of minority patients in nursing homes had risen
174. See notes 105-125 & accompanying text supra.
175. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 153-156 & accompanying text supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 205, 210, 211 infra.
178. For a discussion of the initial Medicare certification efforts, see text accompanying
notes 76-95 supra.
179. The results of the study are summarized in 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 203-04.
The full report is reprinted in id. at 289-315.
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seventy-five percent. In 1969, minority treatment still represented less
than 5.2% of the patient-days in nursing homes, however, and many of
the facilities reporting no minority patients were from racially mixed
areas and all had executed nondiscrimination assurances. o80 In short,
services to minorities had improved and there were fewer all-white in-
stitutions, but there were still a number of institutions not serving mi-
nority patients. Further, the data suggested problems of
underrepresentation and underutilization.
Underutilization of health services by minorities has been repeat-
edly documented in more recent years.' 8' Indeed, current, national
statistics show that nonwhite Americans receive less health care and yet
have more health problems than do whites. 82 This relationship is ap-
parent even when populations with equivalent abilities to pay are com-
pared. 83 For example, in the South, white Medicare recipients receive
55% more hospital care, 95% more physician services, and 250%
more care in extended care facilities than do nonwhite Medicare
recipients. i 4
The only study to date analyzing Title VI compliance by health
facilities was conducted by GAO in 1971, supplemented by a follow-up
study in 1972.185 GAO found that, despite the elimination of overt poli-
cies of racial discrimination, there were still vestiges of a dual system of
hospitals and nursing homes; that is, most health facilities in the areas
studied treated patients predominantly of one racial group. 8 6 For ex-
ample, of the twenty-four hospitals and twenty nursing homes partici-
pating in Medicare in Atlanta and Birmingham, five institutions served
sixty-seven percent of the black patients. One hospital and six nursing
homes were found to have no black patients. On the other hand, a
single nursing home served seventy-five percent of the black Medicare
180. Id. at 203.
181. For recent compilations of data on underutilization of health services by minorities,
see HEW, HEALTH OF THE DISADVANTAGED CHARTBOOK (1977); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, HEALTH DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN WHITE AND NONWHITE AMERICANS (1977)
[hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE].
182. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 181, at xi, 1, 4, 8.
183. Davis, Equal Treatment and Unequal Benftr: The Medicare Program, 53 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 449, 470-71 (1975).
184. Id. Similarly, annual average, per-person, health-care expenditure for nonwhite
Medicaid recipients was $321 in 1974 as opposed to $560 for whites. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 181, at 18.
185. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMPLIANCE WITH ANTIDISCRIMINATION
PROVISION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT BY HOSPITALS AND OTHER FACILITIES UNDER MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID (1973), reprinted in full text in 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 185-263.
186. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 199.
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patients in the Atlanta area.187 Similar, although less marked, results
were found in western and northern cities.188
GAO concluded in the 1972 study that, despite the utilization pat-
terns, hospitals and nursing homes were generally complying with Title
VI.189 Because it found that there were no cases of overt denial of
admission to minority patients or denial of staff privileges based on
race and that all facilities had executed nondiscrimination agreements,
GAO concluded that Title VI had not been violated. It attributed the
patterns of differential minority utilization of health facilities to a
number of factors, including the refusal of some physicians to take
Medicaid patients, referral patterns, patient preferences, and familiar-
ity of minority groups with certain institutions.190 GAO also noted the
special efforts of public institutions to accommodate minority needs
and the fact that the outpatient departments of public hospitals were
often the only source of physician care available to minority patients.' 9'
A difference in utilization based on these factors rather than on overt
policies of discrimination was not, in GAO's interpretation, a violation
of Title VI. GAO concluded that while there was some evidence of
racial discrimination in some of the facilities, the evidence indicated
the existence of more subtle, less overt forms of discrimination: gener-
ally negative attitudes of whites towards minorities, a lack of under-
standing by the staff of the cultural or economic backgrounds of
minority patients, and discrimination against poor people in general.
These factors and attitudes were also beyond the scope of Title VI, ac-
187. Id. at 202-03.
188. A study of Wayne County, Michigan (Detroit area) showed the following: "[O1f all
nonwhite patients treated in nursing homes in Michigan, 84 percent were in Wayne County
nursing homes. Although nonwhites represented only about 8 percent of all nursing-home
patients in Michigan, they represented about 23 percent of all nursing-home patients in
Wayne County. .. 21 had no nonwhite patients and an additional 32 had five or fewer
nonwhite patients each. These 53 nursing homes had only 87 nonwhites among 4,670 total
patients-less than two percent-whereas 57 nursing homes in Wayne County had 2,048
nonwhites among 6,152 total patients-about 33 percent .... ." Id. at 235.
The use of hospitals in this same area showed that some hospitals had very few minority
patients and that others, particularly public hospitals, served a very high percentage of mi-
nority patients. The different patterns of utilization, however, were not so dramatic as those
of nursing homes.
In a review of Los Angeles County, GAO again reported a clustering of minorities in
certain facilities, particularly public hospitals. Id. at 239-43. Minority patients were found
to by-pass more conveniently located private facilities to seek both physician care and hospi-
tal services at county-administered hospitals. Id. at 249.
189. Id. at 198.
190. Id. at 220, 223-29, 249.
191. Id. at 254-56.
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cording to the study.192
Do the patterns of differential utilization of health facilities by mi-
norities that suggest a dual system of health facilities, the underutiliza-
tion of health facilities by minorities, and the more subtle, less overt
interpersonal problems between the staff of health facilities and their
patients, constitute a racial discrimination in the sense that they actu-
ally do violate Title VI? A close examination of the factors GAO con-
cludes are responsible for underutilization indicates that to answer this
question one must do a detailed analysis of the manner in which insti-
tutionally-based medical care is delivered, the referral patterns by
which patients choose or are sent to particular hospitals and nursing
homes, and the extent of control over admission and treatment policies
exercised by individual physicians. If, for example, an individual phy-
sician's refusal to take minority patients causes low minority utilization
of the facilities to which that physician makes referrals, one must con-
sider whether this is a violation by the hospital of the Title VI nondis-
crimination agreement. 193 Similarly, if the refusal of certain facilities
or physicians to take Medicaid patients causes minority underutiliza-
tion, one must ask whether this overt discrimination against Medicaid
patients amounts to discrimination against minorities and a violation of
Title VI, given the high percentage of minority Medicaid patients in
some areas.
Minority preferences for certain facilities cannot be dismissed as
simply voluntary choices by individual patients. It is important to
know whether minority patients are really choosing public hospitals
over private facilities or if they are acting by necessity in response to
the way health services are organized either within a given private in-
stitution or throughout the system.
192. Id. at 200-01.
193. OCR has interpreted Title VI as inapplicable to individual physicians. See note 72
supra. If physicians are covered by Title VI, many of the factors cited by GAO are forbid-
den as overt discriminatory conduct on the part of individual physicians. Aside from Title
VI, the degree of control the modem hospital exercises over its nonemployed medical staff is
substantial. For example, the JCAH standards that a hospital must meet for accreditation
and certification include standards relating to medical staff organization, qualifications for
admission to the staff, and review of patient care. JOINT COUNCIL ON ACCREDITATION OF
HOsPITALs, ACCREDrrATiON MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, "Medical Staff" 1-12 (1970 & 1973).
The control that a hospital can exercise over nonemployed physicians is a complex legal
problem that has never been addressed with regard to policies of racial discrimination.
There are also economic consequences that might arise should a hospital try to exercise too
much control over a staff physician's racial policies. See discussion of Cook v. Ochsner, 559
F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977), text accompanying notes 199-200 infra.
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Nothing in the language of Title VI restricts it to prohibiting only
overt policies of discrimination. The legislative history may well be
oriented toward the prohibition of the overtly-segregated health facil-
ity, 19 4 but a literal reading of the statute does not confine it to such a
narrow scope or preclude enforcement agencies from further examina-
tion of the more complex problems.195 For that matter, HEW regula-
tions 196 and, in particular, the interpretative guidelines, 197 define
discrimination as including both direct and indirect action and, argua-
bly, hold health facilities responsible for some of the factors found by
GAO to cause differential utilization patterns. It is important to note
that when a facility fails to provide services to minorities, it need not be
shown that the facility has a racially discriminatory purpose in order to
show a violation of Title VI. While discriminatory purpose or intent
may be necessary to show a violation of the fourteenth amendment's
requirement of equal protection, Congress may enact legislation that
prohibits acts with a racially discriminatory impact even without a
showing of explicit discriminatory purpose. 198 Whether or not these
factors are ultimately determined to violate Title VI, differential treat-
ment is an important problem. An analysis of the factors responsible
may indicate a solution, either through Title VI enforcement or by
some other means.
194. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
195. While many OCR officials have agreed with this narrow interpretation of Title VI,
others have indicated only that those subtle or complex problems are difficult to assess and
detect. The testimony of Peter Holmes, then Director of the OCR, at the 1973 hearings
indicated that his office considered subtle, nonovert forms of discrimination within the scope
of Title VI, contrary to the GAO testimony during the same hearings. 1973 Hearings, supra
note 7, at 132. See also id. at 37 (testimony of civil rights groups).
196. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1977).
197. See text accompanying note 164, supra. For text of applicable guideline, see note
217 infra.
198. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970) (relating to
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
While the language of Title VI does not specifically address the issue, the Title VI regu-
lations seemingly require only a discriminatory impact, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1977), and
the guidelines for hospitals and nursing homes, note 217 infra, confirm this interpretation as
applied to health facilities. The Supreme Court in a related context has upheld-at least in
general terms--this interpretation of Title VI. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
It therefore seems likely that Title VI will be interpreted in much the same way as Title
VII, L e., that a statistical showing of disparate treatment of minorities will establish a prima
facie case of discrimination such that a defendant facility will have to come forward with a
showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose underlying the practices attacked.
HEW has already proceeded in this manner. N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington Medical Center,
426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977); see notes 201-03 and accompanying text infra.
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If GAO's picture of racial discrimination in health facilities and
the other evidence cited are correct, then racial discrimination still rep-
resents a significant problem in health facilities, and the issues of
whether responsibility for the problem can be attributed to individual
facilities and, if so, whether they represent violations of Title VI should
be addressed. These issues, however, can only be raised, not resolved,
at this point, because the Title VI enforcement program has not
brought these problems under sufficient public scrutiny to allow them
to be properly examined and ultimately settled either administratively
or through litigation.
In sum, the problem may continue either because a narrow view of
Title VI may prevail or because the administrative process may prove
unworkable when applied to the more complex forms of discrimination
that currently exist. Congress may not have intended, or may not now
intend, to prohibit racial imbalance in health services that occurs with-
out overt discrimination, to allow federal agencies to try to eliminate
discrimination in health services tied to housing patterns or social con-
ditions, or to allow agencies to reorganize the manner in which health
care is made available to the public. Nonetheless, nothing in the legis-
lation precludes at least an investigation of these more complex
problems. The legislation is written broadly and its implementing reg-
ulations interpret its authority expansively. Yet the enforcement pro-
gram continues to react to problems that apparently no longer exist,
spending little time and effort on the kind of problems that seem likely
to exist. In fact, the enforcement program is unlikely to discover even
overt discrimination unless it takes the form of official, institutional
policy.
Recent developments, however, indicate that HEW may be chang-
ing its enforcement program. As a result, some of the complex
problems of racial discrimination in modem health facilities will finally
receive the kind of public scrutiny they deserve. A 1977 HEW investi-
gation of hospitals in New Orleans, Louisiana, prompted by a con-
sumer-initiated lawsuit, 199 revealed that several New Orleans facilities
199. In July 1970, a group of black residents of New Orleans brought suit against ten
private hospitals alleging violations of the free-service and community-service requirements
of the Hill-Burton program, discussed at text accompanying notes 24 and 31 supra, and
violations of Title VI. See Cook v. Ochsner, 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1977). The Title
VI allegations ranged from overt denials of admission and the maintenance of segregated
rooms to the failure of the hospitals to take aflfirmative action to correct community attitudes
resulting from past discrimination. In 1971, additional hospitals and HEW were added as
defendants. The Hill-Burton allegations were severed and heard separately. See Cook v.
Ochsner, 559 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977).
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are substantially underutilized by minority patients.2°° HEW has
taken the position that those hospitals must take steps to increase the
minority utilization or face termination of federal funding. As of July
1978, informal negotiations had broken down and HEW was proceed-
ing towards formal administrative hearings. If a settlement cannot be
reached, the courts may be faced with the first major test of the applica-
bility of the Title VI prohibition of racial discrimination to health facil-
ities with significant underutilization of services by minorities but no
overt policy of discrimination.
Another recent lawsuit in Delaware may also force changes in the
Title VI enforcement program and, possibly, in many of HEW's other
programs. 201 A federal district court ruled that in making decisions
200. In response to plaintiffs' Title VI allegations, HEW admitted that it did not have
sufficient information to assess the accuracy of the allegations and entered into a stipulated
agreement with plaintiffs under which HEW agreed to conduct an investigation of the de-
fendant hospitals.
In July, 1977, the Director of the Regional OCR sent letters to three of the defendants
summarizing the results of the OCR investigation and formally advising the three hospitals
that they were in violation of Title VI.
The OCR findings with regard to Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation are typical of all
three:
"Although Ochsner may never have had a formal policy of not admitting Black patients, it
has remained significantly underutilized by Blacks since its opening in 1947. It was not
until 1965 that the number of Black patients for any particular year exceeded 1 percent of
the total patients admitted. In 1967, out of a total of 11,651 patients admitted, 379 (3.3
percent) were Black. In 1968, out of a total of 11,839 patients admitted, 431 (3.6 percent)
were Black. In 1969, out of a total of 12,027 patients admitted, 426 (3.5 percent) were Black.
In 1974, the last year for which OCR has statistics, out of 14,134 total admissions, 899 (6.4
percent) were Black. . . . While the 1974 statistics indicate an increase in Black patient
admittance, Ochsner remains substantially underutilized by the Black population in its serv-
ice area. A study of statistics from 18 New Orleans general hospitals shows that from the
area within five miles of Ochsner 14,333 Blacks were hospitalized in 1974 at the 18 hospitals.
Of these, only 1.7% were hospitalized in Ochsner. Of all Whites hospitalized from this area,
10% were at Ochsner. . . . [A]ccording to the 1970 census, 31 percent of the total population
of the area within five miles of the hospital is Black; 32 percent of the metropolitan New
Orleans and 29.8 percent of the State of Louisiana population is Black .. "
Letter from Dorothy D. Stuck, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Region VI, DHEW, to
Mr. L.R. Jordan, President, Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation (July 19, 1977) (on file with
The Hastings Law Journal).
After citing those patterns of underutilization, the OCR letter made reference to the
Title VI interpretive guidelines, see note 217 infra, and concluded that the facility must
execute a plan outlining the steps that it will take to comply with Title VI.
201. In September 1976, several minority groups filed suit against several health provid-
ers and government agencies, including HEW, alleging that the reduction of services at the
hospital's inner-city site, which served a predominantly black population, and the construc-
tion of a new facility in a predominantly white suburb was a violation of Title VI. See
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 426 F.Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977). Plaintiffs also
alleged violations of § 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
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under the federal "certificate of need"2 0 2 program, HEW, as well as
state and local planning agencies, must consider the Title VI implica-
tions of all proposed projects for capital expenditures.20 3 If the princi-
ple behind this ruling is upheld, nearly all hospitals and nursing homes
will be required to assess the impact on minorities of all substantial
capital expenditures2z 4 in order to meet federal standards and to ensure
(Supp. V 1975) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp.
V 1975).
Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the planning agencies and HEW had approved
the hospital's application under the federal "certificate of need" program, described in note
202 infra without consideration of the impact on the minority population in the inner city in
violation of Title VI regulations related to site location: "[I]n determining the site or location
of a facilities (sic), an applicant or recipient may not make selections with the effect of ex-
cluding individuals from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination
under any programs to which this regulation applies, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin; or with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accom-
plishment of the objectives of the Act or this regulation." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (1977).
See also text accompanying note 216 infra. The site-location requirement appears for the
first time in the 1973 revision of the Title VI regulations, and was later added to the regula-
tions of 21 agencies. See 38 Fed. Reg. 17,978, 17,979 (1973).
202. Section 1122 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-l (1974), allows a state to
enter into an agreement with HEW under which the state will determine whether new capi-
tal expenditures by health faciliites are "necessary." If found to be unnecessary, HEW is
authorized to withhold a portion of the reimbursement to the facility under the Medicaid
and Medicare programs proportionate to the cost of the unnecessary expenditure. Thus, the
federal law authorizes a limited, certificate-of-need program. Plaintiffs alleged that com-
lance with Title VI should be one of the considerations in determining whether or not a
facility had met the criteria for "need" under § 1122.
203. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977). After
lengthy study and substantial negotiations between all the parties, HEW concluded: "We
have concluded that Plan Omega contains many features which will assist in assuring that
WMC retains its ability to deliver high quality health care to all segments of the New Castle
County population, equally and in settings which are not racially isolated. However, other
aspects of Plan Omega threaten this goal and must be altered by way of plans and assur-
ances (to be discussed, infra) to avoid a finding of noncompliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504 of the Rehbilitation Act of 1973. Absent such measures,
OCR believes that the new facility is likely to serve only a very small segment of the county's
minority population and would become almost exclusively the responsibility of the older,
urban, and increasingly racially identifiable and segregated facility." Letter from Dewey E.
Dodds, Director, Region III, HEW, to James A. Harding, President, Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., July 5, 1977, at 4 (on fie with The Hastings Law Journal).
As a result, HEW concluded that the relocation of the hospital's services would be a
violation of Title VI unless the hospital provided adequate transportation for the currently
served (minority and handicapped) patients to the new site, established an ombudsman for
patient complaints, initiated other outreach and patient education activities, and took other
steps to prevent discrimination and to avoid the spectre of separation. Id. at 22-27.
The defendant hospital submitted a compliance plan to HEW which was formally ac-
cepted on November 1, 1977. Plaintiffs, however, have proceeded with their suit claiming
that the plan is inadequate.
204. In order to fall within the requirements of § 1122, a capital expenditure must ex-
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continued federal funding. Although the outcome of these controver-
sies is far from settled, they may represent the beginning of a new
phase of Title VI enforcement in health facilities and a more realistic
approach to the problem of racial discrimination.
Recommendations for Administrative Change
The Title VI enforcement program in health facilities should ad-
dress the more complex problems of racial discrimination rather than
simply ensure that health facilities do not have overt policies of racial
discrimination. To achieve that goal, OCR monitoring and enforce-
ment efforts will have to include a more realistic assessment of the kind
and amount of services provided to minorities by facilities subject to
Title VI.
A major shortcoming of the Title VI enforcement program in the
past has been that it produced no data from which Title VI compliance
could be evaluated. The data generated by GAO study cited earlier
provides 20 5 an adequate basis for a preliminary assessment of racial
discrimination in health facilities and the potential causative factors
thereof. Unfortunately, OCR has never attempted to compile data of
this kind on a regular basis. To perform its functions, OCR must regu-
larly collect and analyze data indicating the kind and amount of serv-
ices provided to racial minorities. The data presumably gathered by
state agencies in their reviews of Medicaid nursing homes 20 6 are neither
collected, nor analyzed, by OCR; the data remains in the hands of the
state agencies. Furthermore, the agency data consists of only a one-
day census of a facility's patients and a questionnaire survey of its poli-
cies.20 7 A realistic enforcement program would require a more sophis-
ticated inquiry into the quality and quantity of services regularly
delivered to discover the kinds of racial discrimination likely to exist
today. For example, if referral practices are likely to be responsible for
differential patterns of utilization, data reflecting patient admissions by
race, source of referral, and type of admission (e.g., emergency, elec-
tive, incident to outpatient visit, etc.) should be collected. Complete
data might be collected only on a sample basis, or only after some sta-
tistical information or individual complaint indicated a need for fur-
ther inquiry into a facility. Data adequate to monitor Title VI
ceed $100,000, change the bed capacity, or substantially change the services available at a
facility. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-l(g) (Supp. V 1975).
205. See notes 185-92 & accompanying text supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 126-48 supra.
207. See description of monitoring forms at note 75 supra.
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compliance, however, should be collected from all health facilities on a
routine basis. Discrimination in health services delivery, in contrast to
discrimination in other areas, is difficult to detect without routine eval-
uation of the services delivered. Health services of all kinds result
from a series of individual decisions made under the most private of
circumstances: there is little opportunity for third-party scrutiny unless
procedures are designed and implemented specifically to elicit the fac-
tors influencing those decisions.208
Despite limitations on agency resources and priorities, good data
collection is feasible. Health facilities are inspected, reviewed, and
scrutinized by a variety of government and nongovemment agencies
for a variety of purposes, many of which perform functions similar to
the monitoring of services to minorities.20 9 OCR could collect the nec-
essary data on discrimination in health facilities by simply increasing
the scope of those examinations. Data collection by such a means
would increase only minimally the cost and work expended by either
the monitoring agency or the monitored facility. For example, a sam-
ple could be taken of a facility's services to minorities and then broken
down by reimbursable services as part of the cost reimbursement deter-
minations under Medicaid or Medicare procedures.210 Data collection
techniques, procedures, and forms would have to be altered somewhat,
but once implemented, data collection would be relatively easy.21' If
the administrative resources are not available to allow HEW to act on
their findings, at least the data should be made available to the public
and to the Congress.
The simple truth is that at this point we know virtually nothing
about the delivery of health services in terms of racial discrimination,
despite the decade of experience of an agency responsible for monitor-
ing compliance with Title VI. It speaks for itself that in Title VI litiga-
tion HEW has had to admit to its inability to determine recipient
compliance.212
Related to the need for improved data collection is the need for
additional and more realistic definitions of standards and procedures
by which Title VI can be monitored and enforced in health facilities.
208. In some cases, the act of discrimination is prior to the admission of the patient.
See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 426 F.Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977).
209. See text accompanying notes 107-13 supra.
210. See text accompanying 74 & 112 supra.
211. The data collected would have to depend on the substantive standards of OCR and
decisions as to the kinds of differential treatment attributable to the health facility. See
discussion of substantive guidelines at text accompanying notes 213-17 infra.
212. See note 200 supra.
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The Title VI regulations that specify prohibited practices2 13 are gener-
ally too vague to allow an assessment of anything beyond the validity
of the admissions policies of recipient facilities. The interpretive
guidelines214 for hospitals and nursing homes are sufficiently specific in
terms of the issues that they do address, but there is a question as to
their validity and enforceability.2 15 In any case, additional interpretive
guidelines will be necessary to respond to the new problems that will be
identified if effective monitoring efforts are introduced.216
Other substantive issues which are defined only vaguely in the reg-
ulations or guidelines will also require further specification.217 It is
213. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
214. See note 68 supra.
215. Unlike other OCR standards nominally entitled "guidelines," e.g., guidelines for
elementary and secondary school desegregation, which are published in the Federal
Register, the guidelines for hospitals and nursing homes were not issued through normal
rule-making procedures. The guidelines are written in letter form under the signature of a
former director of the OCR and circulated by OCR staff; public notice in the broad sense is
quite limited. If they are to be taken seriously and withstand legal attack on their validity,
they should be published and clearly made part of agency policy.
216. 426 F.Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977). See notes 201-04 & accompanying text supra.
NAACP v. The Wilmington Medical Center is a good example of the type of situation which
will require further policy clarification by the OCR. Without further clarification of the
application of the site-location regulation to expansion or capital improvement of a health
facility, it will be difficult for a facility to decide whether or not a proposed project complies
with Title VI absent an individual determination by OCR. Similarly, it will be impossible
for OCR to monitor compliance with this provision unless it undertakes a case by case inves-
tigation of the hundreds of site-selection or relocation decisions made every year. More
specific definition of the policy behind this regulation and the procedures that a facility must
follow to have a proposal approved will be necessary in light of the OCR's overextended
position and its limited ability to conduct investigations.
217. E.g., the first page of both the guidelines for hospitals and for nursing homes cited
in note 68 supra state: "Where there is a significant variation between the racial or ethnic
composition of the resident census and available population census data for the service area
or potential service area, the (nursing home or hospital) has a responsibility to determine the
reason for such variation and take whatever action may be necessary to correct any discrimi-
nation." The guideline is a sufficient statement of basic policy, but it is surely insufficient as
a statement of the kinds of factors that a facility must necessarily correct unless the guideline
is interpreted literally to require "whatever action may be necessary." There must be more
specific definition of the actual intent of that requirement. The causative factor for varia-
tion in racial composition may be a lack of bilingual services, a failure to encourage minor-
ity patients to use a facility, or the personal policies of a facility's staff physicians. As
certain specific factors become identified as major issues, further specification of this policy
will be necessary if it is actually to be enforced.
As another example, on several occasions the OCR has taken the position, unsupported
by applicable guidelines, that Medicare providers must have bilingual capabilities when a
significant number of the beneficiaries of their programs are non-English speaking racial
minorities. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 4, at 137. In addition, Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), held that a school district must provide a bilingual educational
program where a significant number of students are non-English speaking. The application
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important for the OCR to generate such guidelines, because the staff
and resources of OCR limit its investigative capabilities to a maximum
of one or two major health-related cases at any one time. Effective
guidelines will decrease the need for extended facility-by-facility deter-
minations. This is not meant to suggest that OCR should be locked into
substantive standards of such specificity that there is no room for the
exercise of discretion. Standards, whether in the form of regulations or
interpretive guidelines, should allow OCR sufficient discretion to apply
Title VI to the wide variety of circumstances that can arise in the
health-facility context.21 The present standards, and particularly the
Title VI regulations, however, do not adequately delineate basic policy.
Application of these standards to the complex issues often encountered
in modern health facilities is extremely difficult and
perhaps meaningless.
As important as clarification of the substantive standards for ap-
plying Title VI is, it is equally important to adequately delineate the
procedural responsibilities of OCR, its regional offices, state health
agencies, and individual health facilities. Even a close reading of the
regulations, guidelines, and other related material does not give a clear
picture of who is doing what to whom. Monitoring and enforcement
activities specifically intended for health facilities should be spelled
out, even if the Title VI enforcement program in health facilities con-
tinues to have the same focus that it currently has. This change must
include a detailed delineation of the enforcement responsibilities of
OCR and the state agencies.
of that principle to private health facilities is an open question. Unlike publicly sponsored
education or social-welfare programs, health facilities can argue they are providing an
essentially private service. Yet the provision of health care is not wholly private in charac-
ter where it is funded totally or partially with government funds. This is another of those
complex situations where there is clearly a discriminatory impact and the difficulty lies in
identifying the responsibility for the causative factors. It is difficult to ignore the likelihood
that a health facility in, for example, a Spanish speaking area that does not have Spanish
speaking capabilities must know the impact on service to minorities. Arguably this would
be prohibited under 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1977) and under the hospital or nursing home
guidelines supra. OCR apparently agrees; a draft policy on bilingual services is under con-
sideration, but like so many other critical decisions, it has not been completed and is "still
being studied."
For another possible issue with great potential impact on health facilities, see 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(1)(vii) (1977) (denial of participation in planning or advisory bodies on the basis of
race).
218. The usual discretion necessarily vested in administrative agencies may be out-
weighed by the countervailing need for specific standards and procedural requirements in
order to insure that an agency with conflicting purposes carries out its regulatory as well as
spending functions. See Note, Enforcing a Congressional Mandate; LEAA and Civil Rights,
85 YALE L.J. 721, 733-36 (1976); text accompanying note 225 infra.
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A reevaluation of agency procedures would probably reveal incon-
sistencies219 and noncompliance due to either the increasingly bureau-
cratic nature of the procedures involved or to more willful inaction. If
procedural responsibilities were clarified, the public would be better
able to scrutinize the effectiveness of the program, and OCR's enforce-
ment efforts could focus on the critical, substantive issues of racial dis-
crimination in health facilities.220
Another matter that should be reevaluated is the considerable por-
tion of OCR's resources and attention devoted to state-agency compli-
ance plans and attempts to ensure that such plans are adequate for
enforcing Title VI.221 The emphasis on state enforcement activities is
conceptually appealing, but has not been effective; in fact, such empha-
sis has diverted OCR from more productive activities. Although the
state agency compliance plans could be a critical part of the Title VI
enforcement program in health facilities, the plans are neither clearly
defined by the agency responsible for monitoring their effectiveness nor
known nor available to either the public they are designed to protect or
the facilities they are designed to control. Guidelines, or preferably
regulations, clarifying state-agency responsibilities and the standards
for adequate compliance plans should be issued. Certainly there has
been sufficient experience with this aspect of Title VI enforcement for
OCR to do So. 2 2 2
An enforcement program for health facilities that relies on the es-
tablishment of specific standards and on the collection of data un-
doubtedly leaves fewer available agency resources for agency-initiated,
in-depth studies223 or the investigation of complaints, 224 at least in the
short run. Even if the standards are developed and the data collection
procedures are defined and implemented, such a program would pri-
marily define and identify racial discrimination in health facilities. It
would do little to resolve such problems or effectively enforce the non-
discrimination policy that underlies Title VI. These objectives can be
219. For example, the state Medicaid agency must monitor nursing homes but not hos-
pitals. See notes 113, 121 supra.
220. See Tomlinson & Mashow, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid
Programs. Suggestion for Beneficiary Involement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600, 617 (1972). The
authors argue that procedural rather than substantive requirements are more likely to be
enforced since compliance (and noncompliance) is easier to determine with regard to the
former.
221. See text accompanying notes 126-48 supra.
222. See text accompanying note 132 infra.
223. See text accompanying notes 168-73 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 149-67 supra.
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met only if the resources available to OCR drastically increase from
present levels. Given the history of Title VI enforcement in health
facilities, however, this is unlikely, and such enforcement will probably
continue to be low priority for HEW. Consequently, OCR may not be
expected to do much more than identify problems. Further, more seri-
ous sanctions such as fund termination are not likely to be used fre-
quently even if OCR resources are increased, because most HEW
programs are not designed to regulate but to promote social-welfare
activities through the expenditure of funds. Such programs foster for-
mal and informal, cooperative arrangements with the institutions that
receive federal funds and generally try to encourage the participation
and the cooperation of private facilities in health programs. In such a
context, mandatory enforcement of civil rights, especially in the form
of termination of funding, may be opposed by considerable internal
and external pressure. It should be expected that fund termination,
even when threatened, is infrequently carried out and that the HEW
bureaucracy or leadership rejects cutbacks in its funding programs as a
tool to carry out public policy.225
On the other hand, if the reality of racial discrimination in health
facilities were better known, we would be able to confront the issue of
OCR's unwillingness and inability to solve the problems that do exist.
Individuals suffering the consequences of racial discrimination would
be in a better position to take remedial action. Congress could devise
new strategies for coping with the problems, bolster efforts currently
being made, or admit satisfaction with the status quo. At present we
avoid the problem of racial discrimination in health facilities by al-
lowing it to remain poorly defined.
Conclusion
With respect to the modern American health facility, Title VI is an
illusory promise and an unused tool of public policy. The signing of a
Title VI assurance form by a hospital or a nursing home is little more
than the execution of another boilerplate form, one of many incident to
the receipt of federal funds. Enforcement activities concerning health
225. Despite the reluctance of funding agencies to use termination as a regulatory tool,
the termination of funds to health facilities can be an appropriate sanction under some cir-
cumstances without causing drastic harm to program beneficiaries. In situations involving
education or welfare programs, the termination of a program usually hurts the ultimate
beneficiary of the program more than the recipient institution. In the Medicaid-Medicare
situation, however, the sanction will affect the institution, not the beneficiary, because multi-
ple facilities provide medical services to the public.
September 1978]
HeinOnline  -- 30 Hastings L. J. 189 1978-1979
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
facilities have been paper-shuffling exercises; with a few exceptions,
they have not been directed towards implementing a policy of nondis-
crimination or towards solving the real problems of racial discrimina-
tion in health facilities. Consequently, important policy and legal
issues wait first to be defined and then to be settled. At stake are the
lives and well-being of thousands or millions of people.
The Title VI enforcement program could be greatly improved if it
focused on collecting adequate data as a means of monitoring services
by health facilities to minorities and on developing substantive stand-
ards defining Title VI violations in the health-facility context. Without
better monitoring and clearer standards for determining compliance,
the real problem of racial discrimination in health facilities will never
be defined or addressed, let alone resolved.
Once identified, even the most complex problems of racial dis-
crimination in health facilities can conceivably be solved. State and
federal governments are currently attempting to reform the delivery of
health care through a broad range of programs affecting everything
from the cost of health care to its method of delivery and the quality of
its outcome. If either an expanded interpretation of the Title VI policy
of nondiscrimination were formulated or if the prohibition of discrimi-
natory treatment became an explicit policy objective of the state and
federal programs, racial discrimination in health facilities, in whatever
form it exists, could be confronted and, one hopes, eliminated.
That we are at a point when major reform in the delivery of health
services is likely is critical to the evaluation of Title VI enforcement.
Conversely, the history of the Title VI enforcement program in health
facilities may be important to an understanding of the nature of the
problem we now confront in the delivery of health services. If the gen-
eral goal of reform in the delivery system is to make an essentially pri-
vate industry more responsive to the needs of the public, then it is
important to note that the attempts of government agencies to monitor
and enforce compliance by private health facilities with the public pol-
icy against racial discrimination have not been remarkably successful.
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